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GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFERS
AFTER THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976
JOSEPH M. DODGEt
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
Up until 1976 the federal estate tax did not apply to an
interest expiring upon the death of a party1 that was created by
someone (hereinafter referred to as the "grantor ' 2) other than
the decedent, 3 even though upon such termination the power
or the enjoyment of the property passed to another.4 The
phenomenon known as a generation-skipping transfer is a trans-
fer from the grantor to the persons owning the interests follow-
ing that of the expired interest. A trust for the benefit of the
grantor's child for life with remainder to the grantor's grand-
children is the prototype of a generation-skipping transfer: upon
the child's death nothing was subject to federal estate tax. The
theory behind such exclusion is the property-law notion that the
interest of the child ("the skipped-generation") does not pass to
the successor in interest from him but rather from the grantor.5
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Detroit. B.A. 1963, LL.B. 1967, Harvard
University; LL.M. (in taxation) 1973, New York University.
I Examples of interests which come within this rule are legal and equitable life
estates, remainders contingent on survival, and special powers of appointment.
2 The term "grantor" is used herein to identify the creator of an interest under
both inter vivos and testamentary dispositions. A grantor is also any person adding
property to the trust. Of course, the property subject to any interest or power would
have been taxed against the grantor or his estate under the gift and estate tax at the
time of the transfer which created the interest or power. See I.R.C. §§ 2033 (estate tax),
251 l(a) (gift tax).
2 Where the decedent effected a transfer of property and retained an interest in or
a power over the property, the property may be included in his or her gross estate
under I.R.C. §§ 2036-2040. Such transfers are not discussed in this article.
'E.g., Rev. Rul. 55-438, 1955-2 C.B. 601. An annuity which expires at the
decedent's death is not includable in his gross estate regardless of the identity of the
purchaser (grantor), since nothing survives the decedent. See C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER,
& J. McCoRD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXES § 10.2 (3d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited
as LOWNDES et al.].
5 The basic estate-inclusion section, I.R.C. § 2033, states: "The value of the gross
estate shall include the value of all property to the extent of the interest therein of the
decedent at the time of his death." Life estates and powers held by the decedent which
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The only exception to this rule has been for general powers of
appointment as defined in section 2041.6
In practical terms, therefore, a property owner could avoid
tax on the estates of his descendants by the expedient of creating
successive beneficial income interests.7 The duration of such
trusts would be limited only by the Rule Against Perpetuities. 8
The inconvenience of tying up the property in a trust could be
minimized, where desirable or appropriate, by conferring upon
the beneficiaries, in addition to an income interest, one or more
of the following non-taxable powers and interests: (1) a non-
taxable power of disposition of the property;9 (2) powers with
respect to the trust property which are merely administrative in
nature;"° (3) a right to the corpus limited by an ascertainable
fiduciary standard relating to health, education, support or
maintenance of the beneficiary;" l (4) a non-cumulative right to
were created by the grantor, of course, have a value of zero as of the decedent's death.
On the other hand, a vested remainder interest (or a remainder interest which is con-
tingent on events other than the survival of the decedent) is includible in the decedent's
gross estate under § 2033 at its value as determined by actuarial principles. Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2031-10(d) T.D. 7077, 1970-2 C.B. 183.
6 I.R.C. § 2041. The government's attempt to have property subject to a general
power of appointment included under I.R.C. § 2033 was rejected by the Supreme
Court in Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 316 U.S. 56 (1942). The theory behind
I.R.C. § 2041 in the case of general powers of appointment by will and by deed are
those of unlimited control and constructive ownership respectively. Cf. Helvering v.
Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940) (construing Revenue Act of 1934, § 22(a), 48 Stat. 680);
Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) T.D. 6723, 1964-1 C.B. 74 (constructive receipt of income
under I.R.C. § 451).
7 Since legal future interests are seldom created today, the discussion here focuses
on trust interests. The same tax principles, nevertheless, apply to both. This article does
not take any position regarding the issue of whether long-term trusts are inherently
undesirable in the economic and social context. See Kinnebrew, Estate and Gift Tax Re-
form: A Compendium of Thought, 24 Sw. L.J. 608, 624 (1970); Westfall, Revitalizing the
Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 83 HARV. L. REv. 986, 1007-08 (1970).
' The Rule Against Perpetuities states that for an interest to be valid it must vest, if
at all, within lives in being at the time the trust or conveyance becomes fixed plus
twenty-one years. J. GRAY, RULE ArAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942). Also to be
considered are the Rule Against the Suspension of the Power of Alienation and the
Rule Against Accumulations in states where such variations are in effect. See generally,
id., §§ 728-752.1.
' Namely, a power to dispose of property or create future interests therein in favor
of any person other than the decedent or his estate (or the creditors of either). The
definition of a general power of appointment in Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(c)(1) T.D.
6296, 1958-2 I.R.B. 522, describes this exception to the general rule of I.R.C. § 2041
(a)(2) that property over which the decedent at the time of his death had a general power
of appointment is included in the value of his gross estate.
' Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(b)(1) T.D. 6296, 1958-2 I.R.B. 520. Such powers include
those of management, investment and custody of assets whereby beneficial interests are
not altered except as an incidental result of the discharge of these fiduciary duties. Id.
11 I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1)(A).
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withdraw the greater of $5,000 or five percent of the corpus;' 2
(5) a right to withdraw corpus held jointly with a party having
a substantial adverse interest in the property subject to the
power;' 3 and (6) the possibility of receiving corpus pursuant to
the trustee's exercise of his discretion.'
4
The Treasury and commentators from time to time had
questioned this state of affairs on several grounds.' 5 First, the
cumulative interests and powers capable of being conferred on
the beneficiary without incurring estate tax liability in some cases
virtually amount to absolute ownership.' 6 Second, an income in-
terest in itself is substantial both in a property and economic
sense.' 7 Third, inequity results among differing patterns of
wealth disposition. For example, a grandchild remainderman
under a trust for his parent would have his interest reduced by
only the grantor's federal estate tax; his generational counter-
part receiving property acquired outright by his or her parent,
however, would receive such property after it has passed
through the estate tax wringer at least twice. 18 Perhaps another
12 I.R.C. § 2041(b)(2). A non-cumulative power is one that lapses periodically. The
typical situation would be a right to withdraw a certain amount of corpus annually.
However, in the year of death, the power would not have lapsed and therefore the
amount that is subject to the power would be includible in the beneficiary's gross estate.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(d)(3) T.D. 6296, 1958-2 I.R.B. 530. Even this tax risk can be
reduced by providing in the trust, for example, that the power will not come into exis-
tence until December 26 of each year, thereby minimizing the possibility that the ben-
eficiary will die during the period when such power exists.
13 I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1)(C)(ii). A person having a substantial adverse interest to that
of the decedent would include an income or corpus beneficiary. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.672(a)-i (1960).
14 Rev. Rul. 76-368, 1976-39 I.R.B. 9. This possibility does not rise to the status of
a power or interest because it is not legally or equitably enforceable.
15 See G. JANTSCHER, TRUSTS AND ESTATE TAXATION, 162-66 (1967); U.S. TREASURY
DEP'T, TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS, pt. 3 (Joint Publication of House Comm.
on Ways & Means and Sen. Comm. on Finance, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969) [hereinafter
cited as 1969 TREASURY PROPOSALS], reprinted in STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., BACKGROUND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXATION 183-309 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 BACKGROUND
MATERIALS]; Dodge, Substantial Ownership and Substance Versus Form: Proposals for the Un-
ification of Federal Estate and Gift Taxes and for the Taxation of Generation-Skipping Transfers,
1976 U. ILL. L.F. 657 (1976); Kurtz & Surrey, Reform of Death and Gift Taxes: The 1969
Treasury Proposals, The Criticisms and a Rebuttal, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1391-92 (1970);
Mills, Transfers from Life Tenant to Remainderman, 19 TAXES 195 (1941).
The British have traditionally taxed the expiration of life estates, although the
technique has changed from time to time. Finance Act, 1894, 57 & 58 Vict. 53, c. 30,
§§ 1-2, as amended; Finance Act, 1969, c. 32, §§ 36-37; Capital Transfer Tax Act, 1975.
16 See Dodge, supra note 15, at 662-67.
17
See G. JANTSCHER, supra note 15, at 164-65.
15 1969 TREASURY PROPOSALS, supra note 15, at 388. The same, of course, can be
said for an outright gift to the grandchild. Such a gift, however, is in a substantially
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way of making the same point is to state that the federal transfer
taxes should be imposed upon wealth at reasonably frequent
intervals.' 9 Fourth, the "neutrality" principle is violated insofar
as tax factors unduly influence a grantor's selection in favor
of creating long-term trusts. Finally, and perhaps most politically
damaging, only families with substantial wealth can afford to
take advantage of long-term trusts, because only they can antici-
pate that a substantial portion of the capital would be pre-
served."'
B. Over'iew of the 1976 Reform
In the Tax Reform Act of 1976 Congress, with undue haste,
responded to the loophole of generation-skipping transfers by
adding chapter 13 to the Internal Revenue Code.21 Chapter 13
different category of transfers, because the child derives no enjoyment from the prop-
erty given to the grandchild.
"9See SEN. COMM. ON FINANCE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON ADDITIONAL COMM.
AMENDMENT TO H.R. 10612, S. REP. No. 94-938, pt. 2, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. This idea is referred to as the "periodicity" no-
tion, and has no necessary relation either to the notion of generation-skipping or to
that of the shifting of current enjoyment of property.
20 SENATE REPORT, supra note 19, at 20.
21 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2006, 90 Stat. 1879-90, adding
I.R.C. §§ 2601-2603, 2611-2614, 2621-2622 [hereinafter cited as the Tax Reform Act of
1976, or simply as the Act]. Chapter 13 also amends I.R.C. §§ 303, 691(c), & 2013.
Citations are made to the Code sections rather than to the Act sections, except where
indicated. The estate and gift tax reform package first appeared as a separate bill as
recently as May 24, 1976. H.R. 13966, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. RC. H4846-49
(daily ed. May 24, 1976). To be sure, hearings had been held in the House Ways and
Means Committee from March 15 through March 23, 1976, as vell as in 1973. See
STAFF OF HOUSE COMMi. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., PUBLIC HEARINGS
AND PANEL DISCUSSIONS ON FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES BEFORE HOUSE WAYS
AND MEANS COMM. (Comm. Print 1976); STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
93D CONG., IST SESS., PANEL DISCUSSIONS ON GENERAL TAX REFORM BEFORE HOUSE
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, pt. 10 (Comm. Print 1973). See also Hearings on Tax Re-
form Act of 1969 Before House Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 11
(1969). The 1976 hearings, however, primarily focused on the Ford Administration
proposals for higher estate and gift tax exemptions, expanded estate and gift tax mari-
tal deductions, and provisions relating to farm property and small business property.
See Hearings Before House Ways and Means Comm., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (Statement
of Treasury Secretary Simon). The 1976 Estate and Gift Tax Reform Bill, H.R. 14844,
94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 7758 (daily ed. July 26, 1976), as reported out of
the House Ways and Means Committee in late July of 1976 contained (in addition to
generation-skipping rules) provisions for the unification of estate and gift taxes and a
carry-over basis provision for property acquired from a decedent. H.R. REP. No.
94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEwS 460
[hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]. The generation-skipping provisions of this bill
were not modelled closely after any of the proposals previously submitted to the com-
mittee. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94TH CONG., lST SESS., PUBLIC
HEARINGS ON GENERAL TAX REFORM BEFORE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, pt. 9,
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imposes a tax (hereinafter referred to as the "generation-
skipping tax") upon any "generation-skipping transfer" occur-
ring in the context of a "generation-skipping trust" or "trust
equivalent. '22 Specifically, a generation-skipping transfer occurs
(a) upon a "taxable termination" of an "interest" or "power" of a
"beneficiary" who belongs to a "generation" below that of the
grantor but above that of another beneficiary (or remainder-
man) or (b) upon a "taxable distribution" to a beneficiary where
there exists a beneficiary who belongs in a generation between
those of the grantor and of the distributee. 23 Thus, in the pro-
at 4070-77 (Comm. print 1973) (American Bankers Association's Discussion Draft of
Transfer Tax Statute and Explanatory Comments), reprinted in 1976 BACKGROUND
MATERIALS, supra note 15, at 429-641; AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANTS, ESTATE AND GIFT TAX REFORM (1976), reprinted in 1976 BACKGROUND
MATERIALS, supra note 15, at 643-711; AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAXATION: RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTERS' STUDIES (1969), reprinted in part in
1976 BACKGROUND MATERIALS, supra note 15, at 311-79; G. JANTSCHER, supra note 15, at
162-90; 1969 TREASURY PROPOSALS, supra note 15, at 393-401. (Of these, perhaps the
American Bankers Association proposal bears the greatest resemblance to H.R. 14844.)
Shortly thereafter, on August 6, 1976, and although the House had not passed H.R.
14844, the Senate passed the general income tax reform package which it was then
considering after adding its own estate and gift tax reform provisions. H.R. 10612,
§§ 2201(a), (b), 2202, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. S13797 (daily ed. Aug. 6,
1976). See SENATE REPORT, supra note 19, at 13-14, 19-21. Virtually no hearings were
held by the Senate Finance Committee on the estate and gift tax reform provisions, and
in any event the time available was certainly insufficient for interested parties to analyze
and criticize them. The House never passed H.R. 14844 as such; the bill was withdrawn
from the floor by Rep. Al Ullman, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Commit-
tee, on August 30, 1976, following an open-rule vote permitting amendments from the
floor. 122 CONG. REC. H9220-21 (daily ed. Aug. 30, 1976). Nevertheless, the provisions
of H.R. 14844, with modifications, were addended to the general tax reform bill (H.R.
10612) by the Conference Committee in its last day of deliberations. H.R. REP. No.
94-1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 614, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS
1222, 1356 (joint explanatory statement of conference committee) [hereinafter cited as
CONFERENCE REPORT]. H.R. 10612, as amended to include the estate and gift tax reform
package, was passed by the full Congress in September, 122 CONG. REC: H 10275 (daily
ed. Sept. 16, 1976) (House passage), 122 CONG. REC. S16028 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976)
(Senate passage), and signed by President Ford on October 4, 1976, 122 CONG. REC.
H 12425 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1976).
Because the new provisions were not modelled on prior proposals, and because of
the hasty fashion in which they were rushed through Congress, the only direct author-
ity for statements in this article about the new provisions are the text of the bill itself
and the various committee reports. HOUSE REPORT, supra; SENATE REPORT, supra note
19; CONFERENCE REPORT, supra.
22 I.R.C. §§ 2601, 261 1(a)-(b).
23 I.R.C. §§ 2613 reads in pertinent part as follows:
(a) ... For purposes of this chapter-
(1) ... The term "taxable distribution" means any distribution which is not out
of the income of the trust.., from a generation-skipping trust to any younger
generation beneficiary who is assigned to a generation younger than the gen-
eration assignment of any other person who is a younger generation ben-
eficiary. For purposes of the preceding sentence, an individual who at no time
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totypical case of a trust created by the grantor for his child for
life, remainder to his grandchild, a generation-skipping transfer
in the form of a taxable termination occurs within the meaning
of the statute when the child dies.24 If the trustee makes a dis-
tribution out of the corpus to the grandchild, a taxable distribu-
tion occurs because there would be one younger generation ben-
eficiary (the child) who is a member of a generation older than
that of the grandchild. In the case of a taxable termination, the
tax base is computed with reference to the value of the corpus of
the trust on the date of termination,25 and the trust property
bears the burden of the tax.26 In the case of a distribution, the
tax base is computed with reference to the amount of the
distribution,27 and the tax is borne by the distributee. 28 The tax
is computed under the new unified transfer tax rate table, 29 by
has had anything other than a future interest or future power (or both) in the
trust shall not be considered as a younger generation beneficiary....
(b) ... For purposes of this chapter-
(1) . . . The term "taxable termination" means the termination (by death, lapse
of time, exercise or nonexercise, or otherwise) of the interest or power in a
generation-skipping trust of any younger generation beneficiary who is as-
signed to any generation older than the generation assignment of any other
person who is a younger generation beneficiary of that trust. Such term does
not include a termination of the interest or power of any person who at no
time has had anything other than a future interest or future power (or both) in
the trust.
A "higher" or "older" generation (with respect to descendants of the grantor) is one
that is closer to the grantor, such as a child, than is a "lower" or "younger" generation
beneficiary, such as a great-grandchild.
2' The child and grandchild are in two different generations below that of the
grantor. The death of the child constitutes the termination of an interest (the life es-
tate) in the context of the generation-skipping trust. Although there would also be a
"distribution" upon the termination of the trust, the rules pertaining to terminations
control if an event gives rise to both a termination and a distribution. I.R.C. § 2613
(b)(7)(A).
21 I.R.C. § 2602(a)(1)(A).
26 I.R.C. § 2603(a)(1)(A).
27 I.R.C. § 2602(a)(l)(A).
28 I.R.C. § 2603(a)(1)(B).
29 I.R.C. § 2602(a)(1), 2001(c). Under the law as it existed prior to the Tax Re-
form Act of 1976, taxable gifts were taxed under a separate rate and exemption
schedule than that for the taxable estate. Compare I.R.C. § 2001 (1954) (estate tax) with
I.R.C. § 2502 (1970) (gift tax). Pursuant to I.R.C. § 2001, effective after Dec. 31, 1976,
the amount of adjusted taxable gifts becomes part of the decedent's estate tax base.
I.R.C. § 2001(b) provides that:
The tax imposed ... shall be the amount equal to the excess (if any) of...
a tentative tax computed in accordance with the rate schedule set forth in sub-
section (c) on the sum of. . . the amount of the taxable estate, and . . . the
amount of the adjusted taxable gifts, over ... the aggregate amount of tax pay-
able under chapter 12 [the gift tax provisions] with respect to gifts made by
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treating the generation-skipping transfer tax base as if it were a
taxable gift or a "second" estate of the "deemed transferor." The
deemed transferor is generally the parent of the transferee who
is more closely related to the grantor.311 There is an exclusion
from the tax base of up to $250,000 for each child of the grantor
who is a deemed transferor with respect to transfers to the
grantor's grandchildren.3 1 Additionally, the new rules are integ-
rated to a large extent with the federal unified transfer and
income taxes.
32
The new generation-skipping tax provisions contain serious
conceptual problems, predominantly concerning the concept of
the deemed transferor. 33 Of more immediate concern to prac-
titioners are various ambiguities and technical difficulties pre-
sented by the statute. Although many of these problems will
eventually be resolved through the issuance of regulations within
the Treasury Department's broad authority, 34 the regulatory
solution will not provide any help in the short run. The purpose
of the discussion which follows is to explain the details of the
provisions, point out the major problems, suggest solutions, and
indicate some planning considerations.
II. GENERATION-SKIPPING TRUST
A. Assignment of Generations
A termination or distribution does not give rise to the tax
unless it occurs with respect to a generation-skipping trust.35 As
previously intimated, the latter presupposes the existence of
younger generation beneficiaries who occupy at least two differ-
the decedent after December 31, 1976.
The resulting tax is reduced by the available unified transfer tax credit, which will be
by 1981 the equivalent of a specific exemption of about $175,000. I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2010,
2101, 2502(a), 2505. The federal gift tax is computed in essentially the same manner as
before except that the unified credit replaces the $30,000 lifetime exemption of re-
pealed I.R.C. § 2521 (1970), for post-1976 gifts. The federal estate tax is now computed
in the same manner as the gift tax, except that the unified transfer tax credit has re-
placed the $60,000 specific exemption of repealed I.R.C. § 2052 (1954), for those dying
after 1976. The doctrine distinguishing a taxable gift from an item to be included in the
gross estate is substantially unchanged.
" I.R.C. § 2612(a).
31 I.R.C. § 2613(b)(6).
12 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 2602(c)-(e), 2614(a)-(b), 2621.
33 See text accompanying notes 96-141 infra.
" See 1.R.C. §§ 2613(b)(2)-(3), 262 1(c), 2622. See generally I.R.C. § 7805.
35 I.R.C. § 261 l(a). See text accompanying note 22 supra.
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ent generations. 36 Thus, a trust for the benefit of the grant-
or's sister for life with remainder to the grantor's grandchild
lacks the requisite two generations below that of the grantor.
Similarly, a trust for one grandchild of the grantor for life, re-
mainder to another grandchild, does not fall within the defini-
tion of the Act because although there exist two younger-gener-
ation beneficiaries they occupy the same generation.
The placement of a person in a generation presents no
problem where lineal descendants of the grantor are concerned.
Placement of collateral relatives of the grantor is more compli-
cated. For lineal descendants of a grantor's grandparent, gen-
erations are fixed by comparing the number of generations
between that grandparent and the descendant with the num-
ber of generations between that grandparent and the grantor.
37
A spouse of the grantor or a beneficiary is always deemed to
be of that generation. 38 This is so regardless of the age of the
spouse. Hence, somewhat ironically, a trust to provide support
for the grantor's wife, who is thirty years younger than the
grantor, remainder to issue, is not a generation-skipping trust.
For all persons not assigned to a generation by the foregoing
rules, generations are tolled at twenty-five year intervals. Per-
sons born not more than twelve and a half years after the
grantor's birthdate are assigned to his generation; those born
more than twelve and a half years but not more than thirty-
seven and a half years after the grantor's birthdate are assigned
to the next younger generation, and so forth.39 Therefore,
under this rule two persons who are biologically of different
generations can be treated, albeit illogically, as belonging to the
same generation.
40
36 I.R.C. § 261 1(b). See note 24 supra.
37 I.R.C. § 261 l(c)(1).
" I.R.C. § 261 1(c)(2). A former as well as a present spouse of the grantor is con-
sidered to be in the same generation as the grantor. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 19, at
21. Relationships by adoption and half-blood are treated as relationships of the whole
blood. I.R.C. §§ 261 1(c)(3)-(4), 2613(f). Finally, a person who falls into more than one
generation is assigned to the youngest one. I.R.C. § 261 1(c)(6).
39 I.R.C. § 261 1(c)(5). This rule would apply to non-relatives of the grantor and to
collateral relatives whose common ancestor is further removed than the grantor's
grandparent.
4" For example, assume that the grantor's second cousin is 13 years younger than
the grantor, and the cousin's son is 35 years younger than the grantor; under these
rules both individuals are considered to be in the same generation. It would have been
better to provide that once a beneficiary is assigned a generation with respect to the
grantor, the generation assignment of his ancestors and descendants would be deter-
mined with reference to him and not to the grantor.
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It should be pointed out that there is a fundamental incon-
gruity in the basic scheme. If the problem is defined as tax
avoidance by one who enjoyed the property, then a tax should
be imposed upon a termination or distribution regardless of the
generation-assignment of the beneficiary. If the problem is
viewed as the skipping of generations per se, then outright
transfers, to grandchildren, for example, should be taxed. But
the new provisions do not take this step, and for good reason.
Taxing donees of outright gifts and bequests would discriminate
against them solely because of their generational status.
41
B. Definition of Terms
1. Beneficiary
The term "beneficiary" obviously includes one who pos-
sesses a legal or equitable life estate. The statute goes further
and expansively defines a beneficiary as a person who possesses
any present or future "power" or "interest" in the trust.
42
2. Power
The term power is defined to include "any power to estab-
lish or alter beneficial enjoyment of the corpus or income of the
trust. '4 3 This definition overlaps with that of a general power of
appointment whose possession causes estate tax exposure under
Internal Revenue Code section 2041 in its coverage of a power
to appoint corpus to the decedent, his estate, or the creditors of
either.4 4 Section 2041 prevails over the generation-skipping rules
to the extent of the overlap.45 Nevertheless, the generation-
skipping definition of power clearly covers certain powers ex-
pressly excluded from the reach of section 2041; these are a
power to invade corpus limited by an ascertainable standard re-
41 Moreover, there is no social or economic reason why such transfers should be
penalized. Any benefit derived by the skipped generation in the case of outright trans-
fers is speculative at best.
42 I.R.C. § 2613(c)(3). A corporate trustee can be a beneficiary because a "person"
as defined in I.R.C. § 7701(a)(1) includes a corporation, but cannot be a younger gen-
eration beneficiary, because a corporate trustee cannot be assigned to a generation. Nor
can a corporate trustee be involved in a generation-skipping transfer, because the latter
requires either the termination of an interest of, or the distribution to, a younger gen-
eration beneficiary. See text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
43 I.R.C. § 2613(d)(2). This definition is reminiscent of I.R.C. §§ 2036(a)(2), 2038,
which apply to powers retained by the grantor over income and corpus respectively.
44 I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1).
45 I.R.C. §§ 2613(a)(4)(B), (b)(5)(B).
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lating to health, education, support or maintenance, 46 and a
non-cumulative power to invade corpus to the extent of $5,000
or five percent of the value of the corpus per year.47 The estate
tax consequences under section 2041 with respect to a general
power only over income was not made entirely clear. It is likely,
however, that inclusion will result, at least to some extent, under
one of a variety of theories. 48 Such a power would clearly be
included under the generation-skipping provisions.
It is important to note that powers exercisable exclusively
for the benefit of lineal descendants of the grantor of the trust
who belong to generations below that of the power holder are
excluded under the generation-skipping provisions. 49  Thus,
where the grantor creates a trust for the benefit of his grand-
children for a specified period, with remainder over, and names
the grantor's son as trustee, the generation-skipping tax does not
apply upon the death of the son." Since this is a common form
of special power of appointment, the exception has the potential
to effectively swallow up the general rule. 51 The exception,
therefore, will tend to undermine the neutrality principle. If a
revised transfer tax scheme taxes granted as well as retained
interests, retained powers, and granted general powers of ap-
pointment, then special powers of appointment should be taxed
to complete the coverage. Moreover, a special power exercisable
46 I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1)(A). See text accompanying note 11 supra.
47 I.R.C. § 2041(b)(2). See text accompanying note 12 supra. For purposes of the
generation-skipping rules, a "five-and-five" power, as well as one limited by ascertain-
able standards, is to be regarded as a power over the entire corpus, not just a portion
thereof, on the theory that the entire corpus could be consumed given sufficient time.
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 618 n. 1. See also note 54 infra & accompanying
text.
4s The amount to be included in such a case would be the accumulated income in
the trust that has in the past been subject to the power, the current year's income
subject to the power, and any income accumulated with respect to either of the forego-
ing. The debate centers over whether the "five-and-five" exclusion of I.R.C. § 2041
(b)(2) applies to any such non-cumulative power over income. Compare Fish v. United
States, 432 F.2d 1278, 1281 (9th Cir. 1970) (allowing an exemption of $5,000 under
§ 2041(b)(2) with respect to a power of appointment over trust income) with Horner
v. United States, 485 F.2d 596 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (ignoring § 2041's exclusion provisions
with respect to a similar power of appointment).
49 I.R.C. § 2613(e). The definition of power is therefore substantially the same as
that in effect from 1942 to 1951. Revenue Act of 1942, § 403, 56 Stat. 798, 942.
"' The son is not a "beneficiary." The generation-skipping tax may apply upon the
expiration of the interests of the grandchildren, if the remainder is to a still younger
generation.
51 The exclusion would presumably be lost if, in addition to the grandchildren, the
grantor's parents or spouse, or the son's spouse were designated as potential benefi-
ciaries of the son's power because they would not be in a younger generation than the son.
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in favor of one's issue is the most valuable of such powers and it
is difficult to distinguish it on practical grounds from a general
power of appointment.
52
Some significant ambiguities also exist in the definition of
power under the new rules. For example, it is not clear whether
a power exercisable in favor of others which is limited by a
fiduciary standard is within the scope of the new rules.53 The
status of jointly-held powers 54 is similarly uncertain. 55 However,
unlike the provisions of section 2041, the result here would
probably not hinge on whether the co-holder possesses a sub-
stantial adverse interest.56 Finally, a power to terminate the trust
without altering the identities or shares of beneficiaries is not
expressly covered by the statute. In each of these instances
there is no clue in the text or legislative history as to the in-
tended result. Given the ambiguities in and exclusions from the
definition of power in sections 2613(d) and (e), it may have been
better if Congress had left the area untouched.
3. Interest
The term "interest" is defined as "a right to receive income
or corpus from the trust. ' 58 This definition includes legal and
equitable life estates and terms for years, and that which is not a
52 See Dodge, supra note 15, at 678-79 n.110, & 685-86 n.145.
53 The exclusion for managerial powers, HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 47, 49,
strongly implies that discretionary powers limited by fiduciary standards would come
within the definition of power. Such a result would differ, however, from that under
I.R.C. §§ 2036(a)(2) & 2038 for retained powers, upon which the phrasing of I.R.C.
§ 2613(d)(2) is substantially based. See LOWNDES et al., supra note 4, at § 8.9.
51 Under I.R.C. § 2041(b)(l)(C)(ii), a joint power is not deemed to be a general
power of appointment where the co-holder has a substantial interest adverse to exercise
of the power in favor of the decedent. See note 13 supra. (The grantor of the power has
the same status as an adverse party under I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1)(C)(i).) The existence of a
co-holder who is a potential appointee under the power, but who will not succeed to the
power, and not otherwise having a substantial adverse interest, will cause the decedent's
estate to be taxed only on a pro rata portion of the property. See Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2041-3(c)(2) T.D. 6296, 1958-2 I.R.B. 528.
" Unlike the provision here, I.R.C. §§ 678, 2041(b)(1)(C) explicitly state the signifi-
cance of the presence or absence of a co-holder of a power. I.R.C. §§ 2036(a)(2), 2038
also specifically include the property in a grantor-decedent's gross estate where he re-
tained the power jointly with another party.
56 I.R.C. §§ 2613(d)(2) & (e) make no reference to the definition of power in
§ 2041, and it is not expected that courts would treat § 2041 as a gloss on § 2613. But
cf. Camp v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 999 (1st Cir. 1952) (construing Rev. Act of 1932,
§ 501, 47 Stat. 245) (Gift Tax).
" Cf. Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953) (construing Int. Rev. Code of
1939, § 811(d)(2), 53 Stat. 121 (now I.R.C. § 2038(a)(2))). Such a power is expressly placed
in the taxable category under I.R.C. § 2038(a)(1).
58 I.R.C. § 2613(d)(1)(A).
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"right" under present section 2036(a)( 1)59 but is the mere possi-
bility of receiving income or corpus under a power exercisable
by another .6 " Hence, beneficiaries of a discretionary or sprinkle
trust possess interests, as do contingent remaindermen, potential
distributees, and possible appointees. A person, including a re-
mainderman, who actually receives property pursuant to the
trust, or is vested with an interest therein is a fortiori included
within the definition.
6'
This broad definition of interest somewhat reduces the
significance of the exclusions and ambiguities involved in the
definition of power, since virtually any power that might be
excluded from the new rules presupposes the existence of a
terminable interest in the beneficiary who will or might benefit
from the existence or exercise of the non-taxable power. 62 In
addition, existing rules will preempt the generation-skipping
rules where both apply to the same factual situation.
6 3
" In the case where the grantor is also a beneficiary of the trust, the value thereof
would be includible under I.R.C. § 2036 only where he retains the possession or enjoy-
ment of the property or the right to the income therefrom. The term "right" had been
construed to primarily cover situations where the grantor-beneficiary could compel the
trustee, under the terms of the trust instrument or local law, to pay him the income of
the trust. See LoWNDEs et al., supra note 4, at §§ 9.12-.14. A retained power to obtain
corpus from the trust in a similar situation is covered by I.R.C. § 2037 rather than
§ 2036. Compare Estate of Arthur Klauber, 34 T.C. 968 (1960), With Estate of May
Valentine, 54 T.C. 200 (1970).
" I.R.C. § 2613(d)(1)(B) provides that a person has an interest in a trust if such
person "is a permissible recipient of... income or corpus."
6See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 48-49. A person does not possess an in-
terest, however, where the trustee is directed to accumulate income during the person's
life, unless such income is payable to his estate, in which case I.R.C. § 2033 appplies.
1 -See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 49. For example, assume the grantor creates
a trust with his child as trustee, giving the child the power to distribute income from
time to time and/or corpus to the child's surviving issue. Upon the death of the child-
trustee, the trust is to terminate and the corpus is to be distributed to the grantor's
issue per stirpes. In this example, the power held by the child-trustee is exempt under
I.R.C. § 2613(e). See text accompanying note 49 supra. Nevertheless, upon the
child-trustee's death, the interests of the various beneficiaries will then terminate in a
taxable transfer, assuming that lower-generation beneficiaries (remaindermen) exist at
that time. The point is that even if the death of the holder of a power does not give
rise to tax liability, eventually a taxable termination of interests will occur.
63 For a discussion of preemption by I.R.C. § 2041, see notes 45-48 supra & accom-
panying text. An instance in which I.R.C. § 2033 would preempt the generation-
skipping rules is a trust created by the grantor for his child for life, then for his grand-
child until the age of 21, at which time the corpus is to be distributed to the grandchild,
but if the grandchild dies prior to attaining the age of 21, then to the grandchild's
estate. If the grandchild dies before attaining the age of 21, there would be a taxable
termination if his successors in interest are lower-generation beneficiaries. However, the
interest of the grandchild would be included in his gross estate under § 2033 in any
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Although interests properly outweigh powers in importance,
the definition of interest in section 2613(d)(1) is not without its
own inherent difficulty, namely the inclusion of mere possibil-
ities of receiving income or corpus under discretionary powers.
Of course, unless discretionary trusts are reached, the entire
scheme would be weakened by a loophole. The appropriate ap-
proach, however, would have been to tax beneficial interests
under discretionary trusts according to the actual enjoyment of
beneficiaries instead of what they might have received.64
4. Trust Equivalent
The generation-skipping trust concept also encompasses a
generation-skipping "trust equivalent. ' 65 This term includes, but
is not limited to, legal life estates, annuities, life insurance and
other death benefits, and split-interests in general. 66 It is clear
that more than one such interest, even if legally or contractually
discrete, can be combined in order to produce a generation-
skipping trust equivalent. 67 The statute, however, provides no
clues to determine under what circumstances such an equivalent
would be deemed to exist. Hopefully, the drafters of the regula-
tions will provide guidelines that will resolve this issue.68
event, and it is therefore unnecessary to determine whether the generation-skipping
rules would in fact apply to the termination.
64 The beneficiary would be deemed to have enjoyed a portion of the trust in the
same ratio to the total trust as the trust accounting income received by him bears to
total trust accounting income. This suggestion raises technical problems relating to (1)
the period over which such income is measured, (2) the definition of trust accounting
income, (3) the treatment of corpus distributions, and (4) the status of accumulations.
For proposed solutions, see Dodge, supra note 15, at 670-78.
r I.R.C. § 261 l(d)(1).
66 I.R.C. § 261 l(d)(2).
67 I.R.C. § 261 l(d) is reminiscent of I.R.C. § 2039(a), which was enacted in part to
overrule cases preventing imposition of the estate tax upon separate annuity and insur-
ance contracts under pre-1954 law. Compare Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith,
356 U.S. 274 (1958) (pre-1954 law), with Estate of Lafayette Montgomery, 56 T.C. 489
(1971), aff'd, 458 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972) (result under
§ 2039).
6" The various committee reports offer no assistance. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note
21, at 47 n.1. Aside from the "contract" principles embodied in I.R.C. § 2039(a), it is
conceivable that split-interest arrangements could be combined with reference to the
time of creation, the relationship of persons creating the interests, the motives of the
grantors, or the manner in which the interests fit together from an objective viewpoint.
Cf. United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316, 324 (1969) (construing Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, § 81 l(c)(1)(B), 63 Stat. 894 (now I.R.C. § 2036)). Because new Code
provisions have been enacted, the Treasury could probably establish fairly broad
ground rules in this area by means of regulation. See I.R.C. § 2622.
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11. GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER
A. Taxable Termination
A generation-skipping transfer is subject to tax if it is a
taxable termination or a taxable distribution with respect to a
generation-skipping trust or trust equivalent. 69 A "taxable ter-
mination" refers to the expiration (usually by reason of death,
the passage of a period of years, or the occurrence of a contin-
gency) of an interest or power of a younger generation ben-
eficiary where there exists at least one beneficiary of an even
younger generation.7 1' The existence of the requisite two ben-
eficiaries each of a different younger generation is apparently
determined at the moment immediately prior to the termination,
as opposed to the time when the trust was "created, though this
point could have been expressed more clearly in the statute.
71
69 I.R.C. § 2611 (a). See text accompanying note 22 supra.
70 I.R.C. § 2613(b)(1). In the prototypical example of a transfer in trust by the
grantor for the benefit of his child for life, remainder to his grandchild, there is, prior
to the termination of the interest of the child, a future beneficiary who is of a younger
generation than the present beneficiary. Where a reversion in the grantor's estate is
retained, or where the remainder is ambiguous (for example, "to issue"), the persons in
existence at the time of the termination who will take the remainder interest must be
identified. For example, if a reversion to the grantor's estate follows a life estate in
grantor's child, no generation-skipping transfer would be deemed to occur if the
grantor's successors in interest are persons who belong exclusively to the same genera-
tion as the child who was the beneficiary.
71 I.R.C. § 2613(c)(2). The example given in the House Report, supra note 21, at 50
n.3, is not very helpful. It posits a trust providing for income to the grantor's child for
life, then to charity for 10 years, with remainder to the grantor's great-grandchild,
and draws the obvious conclusion that a generation-skipping transfer occurs upon the
death of the child. A subsequent example given in the House Report,supra note 21, at 53 &
n.9, to explain other provisions discussed subsequently, note 134 infra & accompanying
text, unnecessarily confuses the issue. There, the grantor creates a trust for his son for
life, then to great-grandchild A for life, then to the son's uncle (grantor's brother) for
life, with the remainder to be distributed to the grantor's great-grandchild B. It is im-
plied in the example that the death of the grantor's brother would be a taxable termi-
nation. In reality, as of the death of the grantor's brother, assuming that the grantor's
son and great-grandchild A predeceased the grantor's brother in proper order, there
would not exist the requisite two generations of younger-generation beneficiaries, since
the grantor's brother is not a younger-generation beneficiary within the meaning of
I.R.C. § 2613(c)(1). (The termination of the son's interest would clearly have been a
generation-skipping transfer.) It might appear that a transfer in this form would be a
tax-avoidance device. However, that follows from the basic principles of chapter 13.
Since a trust created by a grantor simply for his brother for life with remainder to the
grantor's grandchildren would clearly not give rise to a generation-skipping transfer
upon the brother's death, the result should not be changed by the insertion of prece-
dent interests. Supporting the foregoing interpretation is the wording of I.R.C. §
2613(b)(2)(C)(ii)(II), as applied to a trust for the grantor's son for life, then to the
grantor's spouse, remainder to the grantor's grandchild. If the child dies first, the tax
with respect to him is postponed until the death of the grantor's spouse. See text accom-
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The assignment of an interest or power (whether for con-
sideration or not) does not constitute a taxable termination.
72
This is somewhat illogical, because an intentional termination
should not result in less tax than a termination occurring as the
result of an objective event.73 Nevertheless, the enacted scheme
merely reflects a failure to accelerate the generation-skipping
tax.
74
More importantly, the expiration of a future interest or
power is not a termination. 75 A future interest or power is one
whose enjoyment or existence depends upon a contingency
which has not occurred at the time of the termination. Thus
the death of a contingent remainderman, or of a potential ap-
pointee under a testamentary power held by a present or fu-
ture beneficiary, would not constitute a taxable termination. 76 (A
person who possesses such a future interest or power, however,
is a beneficiary for purposes of determining the existence of a
generation-skipping trust.) The distinction between present and
future interests is difficult to apply to situations in which the
beneficiary might have been able to enforce fiduciary standards
in a court of equity against a trustee but for the fact that the
operative conditions, for example, support or emergency health
needs, never occurred. While contingencies clearly beyond the
control of the beneficiary should probably result in the categori-
zation of the interest as future, the operative facts under many
panying note 87 infra. The phrase "if any" in that section, referring to the tax upon
the termination of the interest of the grantor's spouse, appears to acknowledge the
fact that the death of the spouse is not itself a taxable termination.
72 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 619. A fortiori, a timely disclaimer would
not be a taxable termination. I.R.C. §§ 2518, 2614(c).
73 The gratuitous transfer of a right to income or a vested remainder, which is sus-
ceptible to actuarial valuation, would be subject to the gift tax. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2512-
9(c)-(d) (1970). Gift tax liability, however, would be less than that resulting from a
deemed transfer of the entire trust under the generation-skipping tax provisions.
74 Upon the expiration of the measuring life or other contingency, a generation-
skipping transfer would occur regardless of who then possessed the interest. There is
no tax avoidance under the enacted scheme, because the identity of the person holding
the terminating interest is irrelevant for purposes of determining tax liability; liability is
determined with reference to the transferees. See text accompanying note 98 infra.
75 I.R.C. § 2613(b)(1).
71 See HousE REPORT, supra note 21, at 50. For example, the grantor creates a trust
for the benefit of his child for life, remainder to the grantor's grandchildren -who sur-
vive the death of the child. The death of any of the grandchildren during the child's
lifetime does not give rise to a taxable termination. If, however, the grandchild holds a
vested remainder interest or one which is not contingent on his surviving the preceding
interest, which is capable of actuarial evaluation, his estate would be taxed under I.R.C.
§ 2033.
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fiduciary standards are equivocal in this regard. 77 Although the
rule excluding the expiration of future interest from the defini-
tion of a taxable termination makes sense in itself, it is hard to
reconcile with the inclusion of vested but non-possessory inter-
ests-those of potential appointees or distributees who have not
in fact received anything 78-given the practical similarity of
both categories of interests.
A termination does not necessarily occur for purposes of
imposing the tax at the time that it actually occurs. In several
cases, the imposition of the tax with respect to a termination is
postponed. In the case of a beneficiary who possesses more than
one interest or power, the taxable event occurs at the time of the
termination of the last such interest or power. 79 Although some
tax-avoidance techniques arising from this rule can be attacked
by regulations, others might escape. 8" An example might be a
trust with the income payable to the child until age twenty-five,
at which time the trustee is empowered to accumulate and in fact
accumulates all of the income until the beneficiary's death.
81
Postponement also occurs as a result of the implicit rule that
the tax is only imposed once with respect to each generation. In
cases where two or more younger-generation beneficiaries of a
trust are assigned to the same generation, a taxable event occurs
17 The need for support or emergency health funds is theoretically under the con-
trol of a beneficiary who refuses to work or attempts suicide, but his self-interest would
presumably dictate against his creating the need by such means. This issue has raised
problems under I.R.C. §§ 2036(a)(1) and 2038. See LowNnEs et al., supra note 4, at
§§ 8.11 & 9.12.
" See text accompanying notes 59-61 supra.
79 I.R.C. § 2613(b)(2)(B).
8" I.R.C. § 2613(b)(2)(B) expressly authorizes regulations to limit tax-avoidance
techniques. An example would be a trust for a child where all of the income must be
paid to him for 30 years, with the trustee being directed to thereafter pay the child five
dollars out of the principal of the trust" annually for the remainder of his lifetime. In
this situation, the child's interest should terminate upon his attaining the age of 30. In
addition, contingent remainder interests might be ignored where the beneficiary also
possesses a substantial present interest.
"I So long as the beneficiary is a permissible recipient of trust assets, his interest
would continue to exist. Nevertheless, the economic situation is virtually identical to the
mandatory accumulation trust in the following example, which would not satisfy the
requirements of postponement: income for the grantor's child until he reaches the age
of 40, then accumulated until his death, remainder to grandchildren. It is conceivable
that the regulations will ignore minor trust interests specified in the trust for purposes
of determining the time of termination, or they might contain a provision to the effect
that the failure to receive any significant benefit for a certain period of time causes
termination, even if the beneficiary continues to be a permissible recipient of the trust
property. Under the latter rule, income subsequently paid to the beneficiary would give
rise to a second taxable termination subject to the provision of I.R.C. § 2613(b)(7)(B),
discussed in note 134 infra.
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only upon the last such termination.8 2 This version of the post-
ponement rule would apply, for example, to a discretionary trust
for the benefit of the grantor's children during their lives, the
corpus to be distributed to his grandchildren. A taxable termina-
tion would occur only at the death of the last child.8 3 The rule
does not apply per se to a case in which an interest of one who is
not a same generation beneficiary breaks the succession, but the
one generation/one tax principle is carried out in those instances
by a different means .
4
Insofar as the purpose of a generation-skipping tax is to
achieve parity with situations where the property passes directly,
the one generation/one tax principle is faulty, since the estate
and gift taxes apply without regard to the generation assignment
of the legatees and donees vis b vis that of the testators and
donors. If the rationale of the principle is to avoid excessively
frequent application of the tax resulting from successive deaths
of beneficiaries of approximately the same age, a mechanism for
dealing with the problem already exists in the section 2013 credit
for prior transfers.8 5 Finally, the same-generation-beneficiary
rule is conceptually redundant under the enacted scheme, be-
cause interests are transferred to a younger generation only at
the time of the last successive termination event for the interests
of a given generation.86
Postponement may occur in a third situation where a
younger generation beneficiary predeceases a beneficiary of an
older generation. In this situation, the "unnatural order of
deaths" postponement rule provides that the later death of the
older generation beneficiary constitutes the taxable event.87 This
82 I.R.C. § 2613(b)(2)(A).
8' See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 50.
8 The postponement feature would not apply where another interest intervenes
between those of the same-generation beneficiaries (for example, a trust for child A
for life, followed by one for grandchild G for life, then for nephew N for life, remainder
to N's issue). Nevertheless, the tax base at N's death is reduced by the tax base at the
time of A's death. The end result is that the amount ultimately taxed is the greater
amount comparing the tax base at A's death with that at N's. See note 134 infra & ac-
companying text; cf. I.R.C. § 2613(b)(2)(D) (postponement rules apply where person
assigned to same or higher generation than person whose interest terminated acquires
an interest immediately after, and as a result of, that termination).
85 I.R.C. § 2013. The integration of this credit with the new rules is discussed in
note 153 mfra & accompanying text.
86 For example, consider the discretionary trust example at text accompanying note
83 supra. Technically, however, the tax would apply but for the explicit statement of
this rule. See note 70 supra. The postponement rule is often practically necessary to
determine if the transferees are actually in a lower generation.
87 I.R.C. § 2613(b)(2)(C)(i). An example would be a trust for the benefit of a
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rule seems to be based on no underlying principle; rather it
appears to be oriented solely to the technical problem of ascer-
taining the ultimate transferees of the generation-skipping
transfer.8" The technical problem would not exist, however, if
the scheme were keyed to the shifting of enjoyment rather than
to the skipping of generations per se.
89
B. Taxable Distribution
A "taxable distribution" occurs when corpus (but not in-
come), in the trust accounting sense, is distributed to a younger
generation beneficiary, and just prior to the distribution there
existed at least one other younger generation beneficiary of an
older generation than that of the distributee. 9° The rule for
distributions is essentially a reinforcement of the provisions re-
garding terminations because a corpus distribution is essentially
a partial termination of existing beneficial interests. Logically,
the statute exempts an income distribution from the rule because
it is in no sense a termination of an existing beneficial interest.91
The problem of defining trust accounting income for pur-
poses of this rule is only partially addressed by the statute.92 In
nephew for life, then for the nephew's son for life, remainder to the grantor's great
grandchildren, where the nephew's son predeceases the nephew. The death of the
nephew's son would be a taxable termination, but it would be deemed to occur at the
death of the nephew, which would also be a termination. For purposes of determining
whether the requisite two separate generations of younger generation beneficiaries
exist, the termination would presumably be deemed to occur at the time it actually
occurred rather than the time it is deemed to occur under the postponement rule.
81 Roughly speaking, there cannot be a generation-skipping transfer unless and
until lower generation beneficiaries are assured of acceeding to the trust. But in the
first example described in note 71 supra, even assuming that on the death of the child
there is a possibility that the transferee following the charity might not be of a lower
generation, the tax would apply anyway upon the child's death because no postpone-
ment rule is applicable to this situation. See note 140 infra.
89 See text accompanying note 41 supra.
91 I.R.C. § 2613(a)(1). A loan or advance to a beneficiary, particularly if interest-
free or bearing only nominal interest, will in all probability be treated by the Internal
Revenue Service as a distribution. Such loans are to be reported to the Service. See
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 52.
11 For example, assume a trust for the benefit of the grantor's child for life, re-
mainder to the grantor's grandchildren. A corpus distribution to the grantor's child
would not be a taxable event, because no younger-generation beneficiary of a higher
generation than the distributee exists. Moreover, such a distribution would augment,
rather than diminish, the estate of the child and would directly or indirectly appear in
his unified transfer base.
9 I.R.C. § 2613(a)(2) provides that if, in a given year, distributions are made from
both corpus and income to beneficiaries of different generations, the higher-generation
beneficiaries are deemed to have received the income first. This rule has the effect of
making distributions to the lower generation beneficiaries corpus distributions taxable
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particular, the result is unclear where distributions in a year
aggregating in excess of trust accounting income are made to
more than one younger generation beneficiary of the same gen-
eration. Three possibilities exist: (1) trace distributions to their
actual source in income or corpus; (2) deem those distributions
which are first in time to be first from income; or (3) allocate
income or corpus among the beneficiaries on a pro rata basis.
Application of either of the first two alternatives would invite the
trustees to manipulate tax liability by choosing the source or
order of distributions. The third alternative seems preferable
and should be adopted in the regulations.
Moreover, a fundamental flaw exists in the basic definition
of a taxable distribution. Such a distribution is deemed to occur
where there is only one younger generation beneficiary of an
older generation than the distributee. Thus a distribution would
be fully taxable even where many of the beneficiaries whose
interests are reduced occupy the same generation or one
younger than that of the distributee. The reduction of their
interests by virtue of the distribution would not result in a ben-
efit to generations younger than their own. Such a result is in-
consistent with the purported rationale of the generation-
skipping tax: to tax the trust assets as its benefits are transferred
to succeeding generations.
93
Not surprisingly, where an event is both a taxable distribu-
tion and a taxable termination, to the extent of the overlap, it is
considered to be a taxable termination.94 An example is the ex-
piration of a life estate giving rise to distributions in termination
of a trust.95 The postponement rules are .applicable only to ter-
under the new provisions. For example, assume a trust for the benefit of the grantor's
issue in existence from time to time, until the death of the grantor's grandchild, G,
remainder to the grantor's then surviving issue per stirpes. Assume further that in 1984
the trust accounting income is $5,000 and that $4,000 each is distributed to a child of
the grantor and to one of his grandchildren. Regardless of the label placed on such
distributions by the trustee, there is deemed to be a taxable termination to the extent of
$3,000. This result follows from the fact that the $4,000 received by the higher genera-
tion beneficiary is deemed to be income, leaving only $1,000 of trust accounting income
for the grandchild. The remaining $3,000 received by the grandchild is therefore
treated as a distribution from corpus.
93 For example, assume a trust from which the income is to be paid in equal shares
to grantor's son A, grandchild B, and grandchild C, with corpus payable to any of them
according to their health needs. A corpus distribution to C will presumably be fully
taxable even though only one-third of it is really a generation-skipping transfer.
94 I.R.C. § 2613(b)(7)(A).
95 A distribution is not considered to be a termination in every instance in which it
is, in fact, a termination.
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minations. The distinction between taxable terminations and dis-
tributions is also significant in the computation and payment of
the tax.
IV. IMPOSITION OF THE TAX
A. Deemed Transferor
The tax base and tax rates are determined with reference to
the "deemed transferors" of the property in connection with a
taxable termination or distribution. 96 This term is generally de-
fined, in a taxable termination or distribution, as that parent of a
"transferee" (as defined below)97 who is more closely related to
the grantor.98 However, where such parent is not himself a
younger generation beneficiary of the trust and the transferee
has an ancestor, related by blood or adoption to the grantor,
who is a younger-generation beneficiary, the ancestor becomes
the deemed transferor. 99 An example is a trust for the grantor's
child for life, remainder to the child's grandchild; here, the child
as opposed to the grantor's grandchild is the deemed trans-
feror."t " It is not clear, unfortunately, whether the exception
or the general rule applies where the parent or ancestor was tech-
nically a beneficiary but never possessed anything more than a fu-
ture interest or power.0
1
Under the general rule deemed transferors who are parents
96 I.R.C. § 2602(a)(1).
97 See text accompanying notes 104-15 infra.
98 I.R.C. § 2612(a)(1). Where the transferee is unrelated to the grantor, the deemed
transferor is the transferee's parent having the closer "affinity" to the grantor
-meaning that he is named in the trust instrument, or, perhaps, that he was an em-
ployee or friend of the grantor. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 56. A parent who
is related to the grantor by blood or adoption is deemed to be more closely related to
him than one related by marriage. I.R.C. § 2612(b).
99 I.R.C. § 2612(a)(2).
10,1 The grantor's great-grandchild is the transferee, and ordinarily his parent, the
grantor's grandchild, would be the deemed transferor. Under § 2612(a)(2), however,
because the grantor's grandchild is not a beneficiary of the trust, and the transferee has
an ancestor-the grantor's child (grandfather of the transferee)-who is a beneficiary
and related to the grantor, that ancestor becomes the deemed transferor.
"" Compare I.R.C. § 2613(b)(1) (excluding future interests from taxable termina-
tions) with I.R.C. § 2613(c)(3) (including future interests within the definition of ben-
eficiaries). The latter provision should prevail in interpreting the rules concerning
deemed transferors. To illustrate the problem, assume a trust for son A for life, re-
mainder to A's issue. A is survived by his son S and the children X and Y of his de-
ceased daughter T. T was a beneficiary, but never had more than a future interest. It is
unclear whether T (the general rule) or A (the exception) is the deemed transferor of
the portion going to X and Y.
1284
GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFERS
of the transferee may in fact have never enjoyed the property. 112
Although a parent of a transferee might have received an indi-
rect economic benefit, this would not generally be the case.'0 3 In
any event, this definition of deemed transferor is hard to justify
where a person, other than the transferee's non-beneficiary par-
ent or ancestor, enjoyed the property immediately prior to acces-
sion or receipt by the transferee.
B. Transferee
In order to determine the identity of the deemed transferor
the identity of the transferees must first be ascertained. Ordinar-
ily, a "transferee' is a distributee or a person who accedes to a
succeeding trust interest. More than one tax base may arise from
a taxable event where various deemed transferors are identified
with reference to amounts deemed received by their respective
transferees. Indeed, if one of several transferees is not of a lower
generation than that of the person whose interest terminated,
apparently the share received or acceded to by that transferee is
not the subject of a generation-skipping transfer. An example is
a trust for the grantor's child A for life, remainder to the
grantor's issue per stirpes, where A was survived by his children
and his sister. Although a taxable termination seems to have
occurred with respect to only half the trust, the statute is am-
biguous on this important point, and the legislative history offers
no helpful clues.
1114
102 For example, assume a trust for the benefit of the grantor's child A, remainder
to the children of the grantor's child B. The deemed transferor is B, riot A, even
though B never enjoyed the property. The exception does not apply because A is not
an ancestor of the beneficiaries-B's children. The same result occurs in a trust for the
grantor's nephew for life, remainder to the grantor's grandchildren; one or more chil-
dren of the grantor would be the deemed transferors.
103 For example, the parent's obligation of support would not normally be di-
minished even in the case of a minor child transferee. Of course, the transferee may be
a prosperous adult.
" I.R.C. § 2613(b)(1) states that a termination, to be taxable, only requires that an
interest of a younger generation beneficiary, who is assigned to a generation older than
any other younger generation beneficiary, terminates. This seems to contradict the result
suggested in the text. The tax base and rates, however, are determined with respect to
the deemed transferor. See text accompanying note 96 supra. Suppose a trust was
created by a grantor for his child for life, with remainder in equal shares to the
grantor's spouse and the grantor's grandchild and assume that both survive. The
deemed transferor with respect to the spouse's half would be one of the grantor's
parents-in-law. A tax on this portion seems to have been clearly unintended, in part
because there is no way of determining which in-law has a closer "affinity" to the gran-
tor under I.R.C. § 2612(a)(1), which is based upon an assumption that the deemed
transferor is in a generation younger than that of the grantor. See note 98 supra. Hope-
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The definition of transferee in the Act is subject to further
refinement. With respect to terminations, the transferees are
those who accede to present interests in the trust. 1 1 5 An excep-
tion to this rule, however, would be where no transferee has a
present interest.'l " Moreover, as previously suggested, the dis-
tinction between present and future interests is unclear in cer-
tain situations.' 
7
The identification of transferees is accomplished after appli-
cation of the postponement rules. In fact, the postponement
rules are necessitated partly by the purely technical considera-
tion of facilitating the identification of transferees, and hence of
deemed transferors. 11 8 This rather involved process could have
been obviated had the wholly artificial concept of deemed trans-
feror not been adopted.
In some cases the identification of transferees or their
shares of the property might be uncertain due to the existence
of discretion or a power of appointment in a trustee or other
person with respect to acceding beneficiaries.'1 9 For such even-
fully, the regulations will clarify this point along the lines indicated. Cf. note 93 &
accopanying text supra (discussing a similar situation in the context of taxable distribu-
tions).
"'See I.R.C. § 2613(b)(1).
106 The "present" interest rule has at least one exception. Assume a trust to the
grantor's child for life, followed by a direction to pay the income to a charity for ten
years, with remainder to a grandchild. Upon the death of the child, the grandchild is a
transferee even though his enjoyment is postponed. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 21,
at 619 n.2. Essentially the same problem arises in the context of mandatory accumula-
tion trusts. Assume a trust for the grantor's child for life, after which the trustee is to
accumulate income for the next 21 years, remainder to the grantor's issue then surviv-
ing. Presumably the death of the child gives rise to a taxable termination, even though
the transferees cannot be identified at the time of death. None of the transferees has a
present interest, nor would any of the postponement rules apply.
""See text accompanying notes 76-77 supra. For example, the grantor creates a
trust for his daughter with corpus to be distributed to his grandchildren for their col-
lege education. Grandchild B dies at the age of 16, before graduating from high school.
Did B possess a present or future interest? What about an "extraordinary health
needs" standard in a case in which the beneficiary never became ill? See note 77 supra.
1" For example, assume a trust providing income to the grantor's children A, B
and C for life, according to the trustee's discretion, with remainder to the grantor's
great-grandchildren surviving upon the death of the survivor of the grantor's children.
Assume further that A dies first. If this event were taxable, the transferees could not
possibly be identified, since B and C (being of the same generation as A) would not be
transferees. The postponement rules, see text accompanying notes 80-89 supra, delay
taxation until the subsequent death of the survivor of B and C when the identity of the
transferees will be ascertainable. See HousE REPORT, supra note 21, at 50, 57; text ac-
companying note 88 supra.
109 For example, assume a trust for the benefit of the grantor's children A and B
until the death of the survivor, then for the benefit of those of the grantor's issue who
are surviving from time to time until the expiration of 21 years, remainder to the issue
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tualities, the regulations are to create a set of presumptions fix-
ing the identity and shares of transferees."1 " A principal pre-
sumption would be that where the transferees are designated as
a class, such as "issue," it would be presumed that discretion
would be exercised on a per stirpes basis."1 ' If, however, the
potential transferees are all in the same generation or are named
persons, it would be presumed that discretion would be exer-
cised on a per capita basis. If the class of potential appointees
were unusually broad, it would be presumed that the issue of the
grantor would be favored to the exclusion of others.' 2 This
aspect of the new provisions is most objectionable from a concep-
tual viewpoint, because the tax may be imposed with respect to a
deemed transferor who not only never enjoyed the trust prop-
erty himself but who also is an ancestor or parent of one or more
transferees who might also never enjoy the property, depending
on the ultimate exercise of the trustee's discretion.
Finally, where an entity, rather than an individual, is a suc-
cessor beneficiary of the trust, each individual having an indirect
interest or power in the trust through such entity is treated as a
beneficiary, and is assigned to a generation under the provisions
of secton 261 1(c)."
t3
Where powers, rather than interests, expire, the concept of
the transferee virtually breaks down," 4 unless the transferees
are deemed to be those who then hold interests in the trust and
not those who accede to the power."
i 5
of the grantor. Upon the death of the children, the potential transferees can be ascer-
tained but their respective shares cannot be because that is within the trustee's discre-
tion.
, I.R.C. § 2613(b)(3).
Id. For example, assume that the grantor creates a trust for the benefit of his
child for life, and then, according to the trustee's discretion, among a group consisting
of the grantor's grandchild G and his issue, with remainder upon the death of G to G's
issue. Upon the death of the grantor's child, the transferee would be deemed to be G,
despite the existence of a larger class of potential transferees, because the discretion
would be deemed to be exercised on a per stirpes basis and G is the ancestor of all of
the other potential transferees. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 2 1, at 619 n.3.
U2 See HousE REPORT, supra note 21, at 57 n.15.
113 I.R.C. § 261 1(c)(7). This rule does not apply to charitable trusts or tax-exempt
corporations. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 57.
114 Assume that the power is acceded to by persons holding the power jointly. It
can be assumed that the co-holders are each transferees as to half the power. Yet the co-
holders may not be able to appoint to themselves. Or perhaps a power held jointly is
not a power at all, see note 55 supra & accompanying text, and hence the co-holders are
not beneficiaries. The situation becomes even more complex if they are considered as
beneficiaries, but one of them is not of a lower generation than the person whose
power expired.
115 This approach would in turn probably invoke the presumptions described and
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C. Tax Base
In the case of a taxable distribution, the tax base is simply
the amount distributed plus any generation-skipping tax with
respect thereto that was paid by the trustee out of the income or
corpus of the trust."16 This amount is allocated to the appro-
priate deemed transferors and the tax is computed as described
herein. In the case of a termination of an interest or power, the
portion of the value of the trust involved in generation-skipping
transfers is allocable among the deemed transferors, in accor-
dance with the foregoing principles, 1 7 and the tax determined
in a like manner. 1 8 Valuation of the transfer is to be determined
as of the time of the taxable event, taking into account the appli-
cation of the postponement rules. If a taxable termination occurs
at the death of the deemed transferor, the trustee can elect an
alternate valuation date in accordance with section 2032, inde-
pendently of the decision of the executor or administrator of
the deemed transferor's estate." 9
criticized in notes 110-12 supra & accompanying text, because the interests may not be
fixed due to the continued existence of trustee discretion. Also, if some of the trans-
ferees are not of a lower generation than the person whose power expired, the prob-
lems mentioned in note 104 supra & accompanying text are raised.
116 I.R.C. § 2613(a)(3). In the case of taxable distributions, the tax is supposedly
borne by the distributees. I.R.C. § 2603(a)(1)(B). It follows that if the trust pays all or
part of the tax, the payment is treated as an additional distribution. See HousE REPORT,
supra note 21, at 53. In addition, the satisfaction of the distributee's debt obligation
would appear to create income tax liability for the distributee over and above that re-
sulting from application of the rules of subchapter J, I.R.C. §§ 641-92. See Johnson v.
Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974).
"1
7 See text accompanying notes 96-102 supra.
"'See I.R.C. § 2602(a)(1)(A). The tax base, prior to allocation among deemed
transferors, would normally be the entire trust with respect to which the expiring in-
terest or power related, even though the interest or power itself was not related to the
entire income or corpus. Examples are trusts over which a power to invade corpus to
the extent of the greater of 5% or $5,000 is held or in which the younger generation
beneficiary could have received all or only part of the income or corpus according to
the trustee's discretion. See note 47 supra. The portion of the trust, if any, that is trans-
ferred to one who is not of a lower generation than the beneficiary whose interest or
power terminates should not be allocated to any deemed transferor and should not be
taxed. See text accompanying note 104 supra. A similar result would occur where the
separate share rule, described in note 193 infra & accompanying text, holds that only a
portion of the property is deemed to be transferred. The same principle should apply
where the beneficiaries of the interest terminated had a right only to a fixed amount or
share of the income from the trust, even though the separate share rule would not ap-
ply per se to a case in which the transferees will have a right to all of the trust income.
The statute and legislative history are unclear on this point.
119 I.R.C. § 2602(d)(1). I.R.C. § 2032 provides that the valuation date may be six
months after the death of the deemed transferor or the date of any disposition of the
property within six months of the death. This rule also applies, upon the death of the
survivor of a class of beneficiaries where the same generation beneficiary rule post-
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1. $250,000 Exclusion
A deemed transferor who is the grantor's child has a
lifetime $250,000 exclusion to be applied in reduction of
generation-skipping transfers to the grantor's grandchildren. 12 "
The innocent phrase "transfers to the grandchildren" is appar-
ently to be construed as a term of art. A passage in the report of
the Conference Committee that reported out the Act suggests
that the exclusion is available in any case where the property
vests in the grandchild, even where the property continues to be
held in trust for the grandchild's benefit. 12 It is apparently not
enough that the grandchildren be transferees for purposes of
qualifying their parents as deemed transferors. Without a vest-
ing requirement tax avoidance possibilities would exist,122 but
it is not clear whether "vesting" is limited to the property law
meaning of the term12 3 or whether it also includes the posses-
sion by the grandchild of a general power of appointment.12 4
poned the imposition of the tax. See text accompanying notes 82-84 supra. A trustee can
elect the alternate valuation date regardless of the choice made by the executor or
trustees of other trusts. The rule applies only with respect to taxable terminations and
not to distributions. See CO iFERENCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 615. Although it is not
stated whether a generation-skipping transfer that was deemed to occur "after" the
deemed transferor's death under the principles of I.R.C. § 2035 (transactions within
three years of death), as applied by I.R.C. § 2602(e), qualifies for the alternate valuation
date, the regulations should decide this question in the affirmative. For a discussion of
§ 2602(e), see note 144 infra & accompanying text.
120 I.R.C. §§ 2613(a)(4)(A), 2613(b)(5)(A), 2613(b)(6). The exclusion is to apply even
where the transfer to the grandchild occurs by reason of the exercise (or lapse) of a
power of appointment. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 618. For purposes of the
exclusion, trusts established by the grantor's spouse are consolidated with those created
by the grantor. Where there are several distributions or terminations flowing through
the same deemed transferor, the exclusion is to be applied against them chronologically
until fully utilized. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 52-53.
121 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 618.
122 There would be a tax avoidance possibility in a trust for the grantor's child for
life, then to the grandchildren for one year, then to the great-grandchildren. Not only
would the exclusion be obtained, but the grandchildren, who would be deemed trans-
ferors upon the expiration of their interests, will probably be in a low tax bracket.
Alternatively, a trust for the grantor's child, then to the grandchildren and their
spouses, remainder to surviving issue, could avoid and postpone any tax until the ter-
mination of the trust.
123 In this context, vesting would mean that if the grandchild died prior to the
termination of the trust the corpus would be payable to his estate. Cf. I.R.C.
§§ 2056(b)(1)(A) (estate tax) & 2503(c)(2)(B) (gift tax).
124 The Conference Report, supra note 21, at 618, after describing the exclusion,
states:
This exclusion is to be available in any case where the property vests in the
grandchild (i.e., the property interests will be taxable in the grandchild's estate)
as of the time of the termination or distribution, even where the property
continues to be held in trust for the grandchild's benefit ....
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It seems doubtful if a testamentary (or even an inter vivos) gen-
eral power of appointment in isolation would be indicative of a
"transfer" to the donee of the power, but it is not stated whether
the grandchild must possess an income interest in addition to
the general power of appointment and, if so, what kind of in-
come interest it must be. If Congress had desired to prescribe
the marital deduction terminable interest rule of section 2056(b)
it could easily have done so.' 2 5 It is inexcusable that so crucial an
issue should be unresolved at this point. There are three pos-
sible interpretations of the statute. In order for the child to re-
ceive the exclusion: (1) there must be an outright transfer to the
grandchild; or (2) a similar rule modified by a terminable in-
terest provision; or, (3) it is enough that the grandchild be a
transferee of the child deemed transferor.
126
There is a degree of irony in this situation because the
$250,000 exemption is totally without justification in the first
place. 127 The single stated rationale appears to be a remark in a
House report recording the Ways and Means Committee's belief
that a $1,000,000 trust should be sufficient to provide for the
needs of each child, even where the child might be a victim of
disability or other hardship. 128 The availability of the exclusion,
If the grandchild possesses a general power of appointment, the property will be tax-
able to his estate. I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2). Although powers of appointment are not men-
tioned, and although acquisition of such a power does not constitute vesting per se,
elsewhere in the Code the possession of a general power of appointment is treated as
the functional equivalent of vesting. I.R.C. §§ 2056(b)(5), 2057(c), 2503(c)(2)(B), 2523(e).
125 In enacting the new orphan's exclusion in I.R.C. § 2057(c), Congress did ex-
plicitly incorporate the terminable interest rule of I.R.C. § 2056(b). Therefore, Con-
gress should not be deemed to have intended its application to the first-generation
exclusion.
126 The phrase "transfer to the grandchildren" could be construed merely to refer
to the situation in which a grandchild of the grantor is a transferee, which can occur
where he accedes to an income interest which would not be includible in his gross
estate. The statement in the Conference Report, supra note 21, at 618, might be inter-
preted expansively to consider a grandchild as a transferee even though the trustee is
required to accumulate income during his minority. However, if this was the intent, the
Conference Committee (I) should have referred to mandatory accumulations, and (2)
would probably have stated this rule in the context of defining transferees rather than
in the narrower context of describing the exclusion.
127 There was no exclusion in either the initial version of the bill, H.R. 13966,
§ 7(a), 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. H4848-49 (daily ed. May 24, 1976), nor in
the version passed by the Senate, H.R. 10612, § 2202(a), 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122
CONG. REC. S13797 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1976). An exclusion of $1,000,000 appeared in
the bill as reported out of the House Ways and Means Committee, H.R. 14844, § 7(a),
94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. H7758 (daily ed. July 26, 1976), and appears in
the House Report, supra note 21, at 52.
128 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 53 n.8. The $1,000,000 figure was reduced to
$250,000 in conference without comment. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 614,
618.
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however, is not dependent upon the existence of any hardship.
Nor is it evident that the needs of a child would have priority
over those of a grandchild. In fact, a grandchild obviously would
more likely be a minor dependent. Furthermore, a child could
be a deemed transferor, and thus claim the exclusion, even when
he was not a beneficiary of the trust. 129 Perhaps the most telling
criticism is that the burden of the generation-skipping transfer
tax does not fall upon the child, but upon the successors in
interest. 130 Finally, the limited exclusion cannot be rationalized
within any of the broad theories for imposing a generation-
skipping tax,' 3 ' including the principles of neutrality and period-
icity cited by the congressional tax committees.
132
2. Deductions
Other deductions from the tax base are derived from the
structure of the tax. If a deemed transferor with respect to a
taxable event is a member of a generation that includes another
member who was a deemed transferor in a prior taxable termi-
nation involving property of the trust, there is a deduction for
the amount subjected to tax at the earlier taxable event. 133 This
deduction, which follows from the principle of one tax per gen-
eration, appears to be incorrectly drafted.
34
12. See text accompanying note 102 supra.
1' See text accompanying note 138 infra.
131 See text accompanying notes 15-20 supra.
1 3 2 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 46-47; SENATE REPORT, supra note 19, at
19-20.
1
3 3 See I.R.C. § 2613(b)(7)(B).
134 For example, assume that a trust was established by the grantor for A for life,
then to B for ten years, then to C for life, remainder to D and his heirs. Assume
further that A and C are higher-generation beneficiaries than B and D. Disregarding
the $250,000 exclusion, if the value of the trust upon the death of A was $300,000 and
the value of the trust on the death of C was $500,000, the tax base upon the death of C
would be merely $200,000. This result assumes that A is in the same or a lower genera-
tion than C and that B is in the same or a higher generation than D, in accordance with
I.R.C. § 2613(b)(7)(B)(i), (ii). For example, the rule would apply ifA were a grandchild,
B a great-grandchild, C a child, and D a great-great-grandchild of the grantor. On the
other hand, a trust for a child A, great-grandchild B, child C, and grandchild D, in that
order, would apparently not qualify for the deduction upon the death of child C be-
cause B is in a lower generation than D. This result is the reverse of what it should be:
in the first example, the transfer from C to D effectively skips a second generation,
whereas in the second case the transfer from C to D leaves the property in a higher
generation than the transfer from A to B. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 53 &
n.9. I.R.C. § 2613(b)(7)(B)(iii) adds that this rule does not apply where a transfer would
have the effect of avoiding a generation-skipping tax with respect to any transfer. The
legislative history offers no clue as to what is intended by this provision. See
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 620.
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Another deduction comes into play when the postponement
rule has been applied because of the unnatural order of deaths
of beneficiaries of different generations. 135 In such a case, the
termination of the interest of the higher generation beneficiary
may cause the imposition of a double tax. The tax, if any, 136 is
first imposed on the value of the trust at the time of the death of
the higher generation beneficiary. The tax is then imposed again
upon the same value of the property with respect to the lower
generation beneficiary, reduced by the amount of any tax paid
with respect to the first imposition.137 The latter tax is attributa-
ble to the postponed termination. The provisions are designed to
insure that the outcome roughly reflects the result that would
have occurred absent the application of the postponement
rule.
138
Some conventional transfer tax deductions are also allowed.
Certain losses and administration expenses of the trustee or dis-
tributee, which have not previously been deducted for estate or
income tax purposes, may be deducted from the tax base if the
taxable event occurs at or after the death of the deemed
transferor.1 39 Similarly, if property passes to a charity a deduc-
135 I.R.C. § 2613(b)(2)(c); see text accompanying notes 87-89supra.
1' There may be no tax, since the beneficiary may not have been the member of a
skipped generation.
137 I.R.C. § 2613(b)(2)(C)(ii).
138 The Conference Report cites the example of a trust for the benefit of the grantor's
nephew and the nephew's son for their joint lives, with remainder to the nephew's
grandson. If the nephew's son predeceases the nephew, the unnatural-order-of-deaths
postponement rule applies. Upon the death of the nephew, the double termination
event occurs. The first termination is deemed (contrary to fact) to be with respect to the
nephew, and a tax is imposed according to the normal rule. Then a tax is levied with
respect to the nephew's son, reducing the tax base by the amount of tax imposed with
respect to the nephew. In this situation, the deemed transferor for the first transfer
would be the nephew and for the second transfer the nephew's son. Nevertheless, the
result is not exactly the same as would have occurred absent the application of the
postponement rule, because the initial tax base for both terminations is the value of the
trust assets at the time of the later death of the nephew. See CONFERENCE REPORT, Supra
note 21, at 616.
139 I.R.C. § 2602(c)(5)(B); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 55, According to I.R.C.
§ 2602(e), a taxable transfer within three years of the deemed transferor's death is
deemed to occur "after" his death, and hence would qualify for this deduction. In the
case of a termination, the deductible expenses are those which would have been allow-
able under I.R.C. §§ 2053 & 2054 if the trust had been an estate. In the case of a
taxable distribution, the deductible expenses are those connected with the determina-
tion, collection or refund of the generation-skipping tax. The scope of this provision is
somewhat unclear. For example, could sales commissions not deductible under § 2053
because not "necessary" to the administration of the trust, see Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(d)(2)
T.D. 6826, 1965-2 C.B. 369, be deducted in the generation-skipping context? Cf.
§ 2009(d), Tax Reform Act of 1976 (amending I.R.C. § 642(g), preventing the allow-
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tion will be allowed. 14 " No provision is made, however, for a
marital deduction or orphan's exclusion within the generation-
skipping tax rules, even where the transferee is the deemed
transferor's spouse or orphaned child.
1 4 1
D. Computation of the Tax
1. Tax Rate
The tax is computed under the unified transfer tax tables as
if the tax base were the subject of a taxable transfer by the
deemed transferor. 42 If the generation-skipping transfer occurs
during the deemed transferor's lifetime, the tax base is added to
the deemed transferor's cumulative prior gifts and generation-
skipping transfers. If his death has occurred or is itself the event
giving rise to the taxable termination, the tax base is treated as a
second taxable estate. The cumulative tax base thus consists of
post-1976 gifts, prior generation-skipping transfers, the taxable
estate, and the present generation-skipping transfers. The tax
computed on the cumulative tax base is then credited with the
tax paid on the transfers represented in the base that occurred
prior to the present generation-skipping transfers. In short, the
generation-skipping transfer is taxed at the deemed transferor's
highest marginal rate brackets.' 43 If the generation-skipping
ance of both a deduction under I.R.C. § 2053 and a reduction in the amount realized
upon sale in determining gain or loss).
1411 I.R.C. § 2602(c)(2). If all of the property passes to a charitable transferee, there
would be no tax at all. Assume a trust for the grantor's child C for life, theA for charity
for ten years, remainder to grandchild. The death of C, not the expiration of ten years,
would be the taxable event.
,41 See I.R.C. § 2602(c)(1). A transfer to a beneficiary's spouse would not he subject
to the tax in any event because generational requirements would not be met. See note
70 supra & accompanying text. If the death of the grantor's spouse were a taxable
transfer under a generation-skipping tax, then logically the spouse's interest could qual-
ify for the marital deduction. Such a rule would effectively eliminate the need for giv-
ing the spouse a general power of appointment within IRC § 2056(b)(5). However, in so
far as power of appointment trusts are already utilized to deprive spouses of lifetime
control over assets, a rule which would effectively deprive them of even testamentary
control over such assets may be socially and politically undesirable.
The orphan's exclusion is found in I.R.C. § 2057, and is available only if the dece-
dent does not leave a surviving spouse. The deduction equals $5,000 multiplied by the
number of years under the age of 21 of each minor child. The orphan's exclusion
contains a modified terminable interest rule similar to that found in I.R.C. § 2056(b).
See note 125 supra.
142 For an outline of the unified transfer tax system, see note 29 supra.
14 3 See I.R.C. § 2602(a). In the case of a deemed transferor who is a non-resident
and not a citizen of the United States, and in which the transfer occurred at or after his
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transfer occurs within three years of the deemed transferor's
death, the new contemplation of death rule applies, and the
transfer is deemed to occur just after the deemed transferor's
death. 144
Although inconsistent with the foregoing, the generation-
skipping transfers are not part of a deemed transferor's cumula-
tive tax base for conventional estate and gift tax purposes.1 45
Therefore, estate and gift taxes are not increased by genera-
tion-skipping transfers, probably on the theory that they are
beyond the control of the deemed transferor. This rationale is
irrelevant, however, because the tax is really borne not by the
transferors but by the transferees, who lack control not only over
generation-skipping transfers but also over gifts and bequests
received by them. Thus there appears to be no compelling
reason why the generation-skipping tax cannot be more closely
integrated with the estate and gift taxes.
The tax rate may be affected by the interplay of the new
rules with the marital deduction. If the taxable transfer occurs
(or is deemed to occur) at or within nine months after the date
of the deemed transferor's death, the generation-skipping trans-
fer is added to the deemed transferor's gross estate for purposes
of determining the maximum marital deduction. 146 If this fea-
ture is used to advantage, the marginal rates applicable to both
the generation-skipping transfer and the taxable estate may be
reduced.147 This provision may be undesirable, however, be-
cause its applicability will probably be determined, with undesir-
able and unintended results, by instruments drafted without
knowledge of the provision's existence or import. In any event,
death, only the taxable estate, and not prior gifts, is considered for the purpose of
determining the tax rate. I.R.C. § 2614(b)(2).
,44 I.R.C. § 2620(e); CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 617. For a discussion of
an issue ancillary to this rule, see note 108 supra. Under I.R.C. § 2035, amended by the
Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 2001(a)(5), a transfer within three years of the decedent's
death is included in the decedent's gross estate without regard to the decedent's motive.
'4 5.See HousE REPORT, supra note 2 1, at 56 n.13. Of course, a generation-skipping
transfer is included in the deemed transferor's cumulative tax base for purposes of
calculating the tax rate applicable to subsequent generation-skipping transfers deemed
to be made by him.
146 I.R.C. § 2602(c)(5)(A).
117 See House REPORT, supra note 21, at 54. A generation-skipping transfer occur-
ring within three years of the deemed transferor's death would also come within this
rule. See note 128 supra. The Conference Report, supra note 21, at 616, indicates that
marital deduction bequests are not to be deemed terminable interests simply because
the facts fixing the amount thereof might occur during the nine-month period follow-
ing the deemed transferor's death.
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the transfer does not itself qualify for the estate tax marital de-
duction.'
48
2. Credits
The generation-skipping tax is subject to any unused por-
tion of the deemed transferor's unified transfer tax credit.
49
That this rule applies only if the taxable event occurs (or is
deemed to occur) at or after the death of the deemed transferor
seems inequitable, but it prevents certain tax-avoidance possi-
bilities. 5 " It is not clear whether the unused credit referred to is
that existing at the deemed transferor's death, after the estate
tax, or that existing as of the later generation-skipping transfer.
This issue will be significant where the deemed transferor's
death occurs between 1977 and 1980 inclusive.'5'
The section 2013 credit for prior estate transfers within ten
years is to be fully available.' 52 This credit will now apply where
a generation-skipping tax was imposed with respect to a deemed
transferor at or after his death, and subsequently the same prop-
erty is taxed again. In other words, the generation-skipping tax
is treated as a prior estate tax, and is itself deemed to be avail-
able for the section 2013 credit.'53 If the "generation" concept is
148 The property is neither includible in the deemed transferor's gross estate nor
does it "pass" from him to his spouse as required by I.R.C. §§ 2056(a) & (d). For further
discussion on the interplay of the generation-skipping tax with the marital deduction,
see text accompanying notes 183-89 infra.
49 See I.R.C. § 2602(c)(3). See also note 29 supra.
15" For example, generation-skipping transfers could be routed through living
deemed transferors in low tax brackets with large unused credits. An example would be
a trust for the benefit of a series of beneficiaries, each interest to be cut off at age 30.
The Rule Against Perpetuities would limit the tax-avoidance potential of such schemes.
See note 8 supra.
155 The unified transfer credit is phased in gradually during this period. See I.R.C.
§ 2010(b); note 188 infra. Arguably, the amount of the credit is determined as of the
time of the deemed transferor's death. However, the date of the transfer is the more
appropriate time in the present context. A minor problem concerning the unused uni-
fied transfer tax credit is that for estate tax purposes the credit is used prior to the
other available credits, thereby potentially reducing the amount available for the
generation-skipping tax. I.R.C. §§ 2011(f), 2013(e)(1)(A), 2014(b)(2), as amended &
added by Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 2001(c)(1)(A), (C), (G).
152 See I.R.C. § 2602(c)(4).
153 1d.; see LR.C. § 2013(g), added by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 2006(b)(2);
HousE REPORT, supra note 21, at 54. The subsequent tax must be an estate tax or a
generation-skipping tax, not a gift tax. Under prior law, one who acquired a life estate
by bequest was deemed to have acquired, for purposes of I.R.C. § 2013, the actuarial
value (at the time of the grantor's death) of the life estate, even though the life estate
was not itself subject to estate tax in the hands of the life tenant. Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2013-4(a) T.D. 6296, 1958-2 I.R.B. 457. Henceforth, the excess of the value of the
property over such actuarial value will also be deemed a transfer by the grantor to the
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so important that the new tax should be based upon it, then the
section 2013 credit should have been expanded to conform more
closely to that concept. 15 4 Had this been done the definition of
"generation" could have been drafted more realistically, or even
omitted, and the one generation/one tax concept abandoned.1 55
The section 2011 credit may be taken where the transfer is
also subject to state death tax, 56 but the section 2012 credit for
prior gift tax is of course not available.
15 7
E. Liability and Procedures
The tax is not owed by the deemed transferor or his estate.
Rather, in the case of a taxable termination, it is payable out of
the trust property and, in the case of a taxable distribution, the
distributees are personally liable.158 Recall that an event that is
both a termination and a distribution with respect to any prop-
life tenant, who is a deemed transferor, for purposes of applying the § 2013 credit. See
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 616. The § 2013 credit is not available where the
initial transfer was a taxable gift. See note 157 infra & accompanying text.
15' The present credit is phased out as the time spread between the imposition of
two "estate taxes" increases from three to ten years. I.R.C. § 2013(a). This phase-out
could be stretched to 20 or 30 years in order to bring the credit in greater conformity
with a "generation" or "periodicity" notion. Both concepts, however, are equally irrele-
vant to a conceptually pure transfer tax scheme. See text accompanying note 19 supra.15' See text accompanying notes 82-86 supra.
156 I.R.C. § 2602(c)(5)(C). This would occur only if the generation-skipping transfer
were itself subject to a state death tax, which seems unlikely, except perhaps in the case
of some special powers of appointment. This provision may anticipate future state legis-
lation imposing a tax on generation-skipping transfers. In any event, the credit under
this provision cannot exceed the amount by which the state tax credit, as limited by
the ceiling in I.R.C. § 2011(b), would have been increased if the generation-skipping
transfer had been included in the deemed transferor's gross estate. See HousE REPORT,
supra note 21, at 54-55.
157 See I.R.C. § 2602(c)(1). The gift tax credit, I.R.C. § 2012, is repealed for gifts
made after 1976, because the gift tax is subtracted in computing the estate tax. See
I.R.C. § 2012(e) added by Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 2001(a)(3); note 29supra.
158 I.R.C. § 2603(a)(1). The distributee is liable for the tax only to the extent of the
fair market value of the property at the date of distribution. I.R.C. § 2603(a)(3). In the
case of a taxable termination, the trustee is permitted to request from the Internal Rev-
enue Service information concerning the generation-skipping transfer tax rate bracket
of the deemed transferor and the extent to which the $250,000 exclusion has already
been utilized, and the trustee will not be personally liable for any shortfall in the tax
caused by his reliance on the information so provided. I.R.C. § 2603(a)(2). The trustee
can also obtain information from the Service concerning the valuation of property in-
cluded within a generation-skipping transfer. I.R.C. § 7517, added by Tax Reform Act
of 1976, § 2008(a)(1). See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 57-58 & n.16. Regardless of
these limits on the personal liability of the distributees and trustees, the property trans-
ferred is subject to a lien until the tax is paid or becomes unenforceable due to the
running of the statute of limitations. I.R.C. § 2603(b); HousE REPORT, supra note 21, at
58. The rules concerning personal liability and liens come into play only if the tax is not
paid when due.
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erty is deemed to be a taxable termination with respect to that
property.1 59 Of course, the grantor may direct the trustee to pay
the tax in all instances, but this would increase the tax base pro
tanto for taxable distributions.161 1 In this respect the generation-
skipping tax resembles the estate tax but not the gift tax under
which the donor bears the burden with no "grossing up."
1 6 '
Where an event triggers simultaneous taxable transfers with
respect to two or more trusts, resulting in a tax computed with
reference to a common deemed transferor, the tax is computed
as if the aggregate of such transfers had been a single transfer
and the tax imposed upon each trust is the amount that bears
the same ratio to the total tax as the fair market value of each
transfer bears to the total fair market value of the property
transferred.1
6 2
Generally, the person liable for the tax will be required to
file a return.16 3 If the deemed transferor is alive at the time of
the transfer, the return date is the ninetieth day after the close
of the trust's taxable year in which the transfer occurred.
6 4 If
the transfer occurs at or after the deemed transferor's death, the
return will be due at the earlier of ninety days after the estate tax
return is due (taking.applicable extensions into account) or nine
months after the transfer occurs.'6 5 Otherwise, normal estate
' See text accompanying note 94 supra.
160 For a discussion of the tax effect of such a payment, see note 116 supra &
accompanying text. Draftsmen of generation-skipping trusts should provide for this
possibility.
161 Compare I.R.C. § 2205 (estate tax) with I.R.C. § 2502(d) (gift tax).
162 I.R.C. § 2602(d). The formula would be based upon the fair-market value of the
trust property, in the case of a termination, and upon the value of a distribution. For
example, assume that the grantor's child is a beneficiary of two trusts, with remainder
over to the child's issue. Upon death of the child, assume that the values of the trusts
are $3,000,000 and $7,000,000 respectively. The tax will be computed under chapter 13
as though there had been a single transfer of a trust valued at $10,000,000. The result-
ing tax will be allocated between the two trusts on a 30-70 ratio. The effect of this rule
is to spread the effect of the progressive marginal rates among the transfers involved.
See HoUsE REPORT, supra note 21, at 55. Unfortunately, it is not stated how the values
of any deductions are to be allocated in computing the generation-skipping tax. See id.
The $250,000 exclusion is to be allocated among the trusts in proportion to their fair-
market values in the case of simultaneous taxable events. Id. at 53.
16 3 See I.R.C. § 2621(c)(1), which provides guidelines for Treasury regulations in
this area. The distributee or trustee will presumably be required to file regardless of
who actually pays the tax. See note 158 supra & accompanying text. Returns are to be
filed even if no generation-skipping tax is due. See HousE REPORT, supra note 21, at
58-59.
164 I.R.C. § 2621(c)(1)(B)(i).
165 I.R.C. § 2621(c)(1)(B)(ii); CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 617. In addi-
tion, the trustee may be required to file information returns, without regard to the
1977]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 125:1265
and gift tax procedural rules apply. 166
V. RELATIONSHIP TO THE INCOME TAX'
1 7
The principles of section 691, relating to income in respect
of a decedent, are applicable to generation-skipping trusts.' An
income item or right thereto may be included in the generation-
skipping tax base, even though the item is neither received nor
reportable for income tax purposes by the trust or distributee
until after the date of the generation-skipping transfer. In such a
case, assuming that the generation-skipping transfer occurs at or
after the death of the deemed transferor, the net generation-
skipping tax attributable to that item is available as an income tax
deduction for the trust or distributee required to report it as
income.6 .9
The new carry-over basis rules of section 1023 for property
acquired from a decedent apply to property subject to a
generation-skipping transfer, provided again that the transfer
occurs at or after the death of the deemed transferor. 17" This
provision enables the trust or distributee to obtain certain up-
ward adjustments to basis. For property presently in existence,
occurrence of a taxable transfer. I.R.C. § 2621(c)(2). For an example of a situation in
which such a return might be required, see note 90 supra.
66 See I.R.C. § 2621(a). Whether gift tax or estate tax procedures apply depends
upon whether the generation-shipping transfer occurred before (gift tax rules) or at or
after (estate tax rules) the deemed transferor's death. I.R.C. §§ 6166 and 6166A, relat-
ing to the postponement of tax payment where the estate consists largely of an interest
in a closely-held business, do not apply to the generation-shipping tax. I.R.C. § 2621(b).
167 Some of the relationships of the generation-skipping tax to the estate and gift
tax have already been mentioned. See notes 45, 63, 145 & accompanying text, note 166
supra.
168 I.R.C. § 691(c)(3), added by Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 2006(b)(3).
169 I.R.C. § 691(c)(3)(C). See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 616. The House
version of the bill, H.R. 14844, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. H7758 (daily ed.
July 26, 1976), proposed I.R.C. § 2614(a), which would have allowed a trust distributee
required to report income under I.R.C. §§ 652 or 662 (requiring inclusion of income
received by beneficiaries of trusts distributing current income and accumulating income
or distributing corpus, respectively), an income tax deduction equal to the net
generation-skipping tax. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 58. This provision was
fortunately dropped in conference. Otherwise, the transfer tax would have lost its na-
ture as a separate tax on capital already subject to income taxes.
171 I.R.C. § 2614(a). Under I.R.C. § 1023, added by Tax Reform Act of 1976,
§ 2005, the estate or heir (trust or distributee) acquires the same basis as that of the
decedent. In the case of property subject to the estate tax, $10,000 of personal effects
are exempt from the rule; the minimum basis of other property is $60,000 (or the
estate tax value thereof). I.R.C. § 1023(b)(3), (d). These exemptions do not apply, how-
ever, to a generation-skipping transfer. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 614.
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the basis (for the purpose of determining gain but not loss) will
be stepped-up to its value as of December 31, 1976.11 In addi-
tion, the adjusted basis of the property in the hands of the trust
or distributee is increased (but not above its value) by that por-
tion of the generation-skipping tax which is attributable to the
appreciation element in the trust property.17 2 A similar adjust-
ment is also available for trust property where the generation-
skipping transfer occurred prior to the death of the deemed
transferor. 173 The adjustment is sensible conceptually because
it achieves the same result as the income tax deduction for in-
come in respect of a decedent.'
74
In cases where the trust consists of stock in a closely-held
corporation, the redemption rules of section 303, as revised by
the Tax Reform Act of 1976, apply to the trust as if it were a
separate estate.1 75 Section 303 will be of greatly reduced signifi-
cance, however, once the impact of the carry-over basis rules is
felt.'
76
171 in the case of marketable securities this is the actual fair market value on De-
cember 31, 1976. For other property, the increase over the basis up to the decedent's
death (generation-skipping transfer) is prorated in accordance with the ratio of the
number of days in the holding period prior to January 1, 1977, to the total number of
days in the holding period. I.R.C. § 1023(h)(2). The carryover basis provisions do not
apply to income in respect of a decedent, the proceeds of life insurance, and annuity
payments. I.R.C. § 1023(b)(2). See HousE REPORT, supra note 21, at 36-46; CONFERENCE
REPORT, supra note 21, at 611-13.
172 I.R.C. § 2614(a); see I.R.C. §§ 1023(c) & (0(3).
173 I.R.C. § 2614(a). This rule parallels a change in the basis rule with respect to
inter vivos gifts in general. I.R.C. § I015(d)(6), added by Tax Reform Act of 1976,
§ 2005(c). The previous rule had been that the basis was increased (up to the fair
market value at the time of the gift) by the entire gift tax paid. I.R.C. § 1015(d)(1)(A)
(1958). See HousE REPORT, supra note 21, at 58.
174 See note 169 supra & accompanying text. The "income" is the unrealized ap-
preciation which will eventually become gain to the trust or distributee, and the "deduc-
tion" is the increase in basis which will reduce the amount of such income.
175 I.R.C. § 303(d), added by Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 2006(b)(4). For this
purpose, the value of the stock is measured against the amount of the generation-
skipping transfer and not the entire trust or estate. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note
21, at 616. I.R.C. § 303(b)(2)(A) was amended to provide that, in order to qualify
for a capital gains redemption, the value of the stock must exceed 50% of the ad-
justed gross estate (or the generation-skipping transfer). Tax Reform Act of 1976,
§ 2004(e)(2).
176 Under pre-1977 law, the stepped-up basis rule of I.R.C. § 1014 resulted in little
or no gain on the redemption of stock. The December 31, 1976 adjustment provi-
sion, note 171 supra, will preserve this advantage for a while. Section 303 guarantees
capital gains treatment for the redemption, but the now more potent minimum tax on
tax preference items, I.R.C. §§ 56 & 57, will dilute this benefit.
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VI. IMPACT ON ESTATE PLANNING
A. Exclusions and Deductions
The first issue confronting estate planners is the extent to
which they can reasonably avoid the new generation-skipping tax
provisions. 7 7 The most glaring escape route is the $250,000 ex-
clusion for generation-skipping transfers to the grantor's grand-
children.1 7 8 The exclusion creates an incentive to avoid at least
one round of estate tax, without regard to the intrinsic desirabil-
ity of maintaining trusts for adult children until or after their
death. The fairly wealthy can be expected to continue to avail
themselves of the generation-skipping trust, but the amount of
aggregate assets placed in such trusts is likely to be in direct
proportion to the number of children of the grantor who have
children. 17 9 It would be risky to designate the succeeding in-
terests as "issue," however, because the exclusion will be lost
unless the transferees are the grantor's grandchildren."," The
problem, previously discussed, of ascertaining what constitutes a
"transfer to" the grandchildren must also be considered.'
Even if the exclusion is insufficient or unavailable, the estate
planner can utilize the deemed transferor's unused unified
transfer tax credit to offset t.he generation-skipping tax. To do
so effectively, future trust interests should be created so that the
deemed transferors will be persons likely to be relatively impe-
cunious. Of course, it is difficult to accurately predict an in-
17 Some observers might contend that the generation-skipping tax is unconstitu-
tional. An unapportioned "direct" tax (which is not an income tax) is unconstitutional.
See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; § 8, cl. 1; § 9, c. 4; amend. XVI. The definition of a
"direct" tax, however, is not entirely clear. It is likely that courts would view a tax based
upon the shifting of the enjoyment of property rather than ownership as an "excise"
tax rather than a "direct" tax. See Fernandez v. Weiner, 326 U.S. 340 (1945).
175 See text accompanying notes 120-32 supra.
179 The exclusion is for each child of the grantor who is a deemed transferor.
I.R.C. § 2613(b)(6). Since the identity of the deemed transferor hinges on the identity
of the transferees, the number of exclusions cannot be predicted with certainty when a
trust for "children" is set up. This uncertainty provides some incentive to create sepa-
rate trusts for each child, since the child's child is more likely to be alive at the death of
his parent than at the death of the survivor among his parent and the parent's siblings.
A countervailing consideration is that, in cases in which the child's child predeceases
him, the $250,000 exclusion can be lost, at least where the ultimate transferees would
not be grandchildren of the grantor. This factor can be avoided by establishing a dis-
cretionary trust with respect to the grantor's children, favoring the grantor's grand-
children as a class as the remainder interest (as opposed to favoring the grantor's issue
per stirpes).
""
1 
See note 179 supra.
"I See note 122 supra & accompanying text.
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dividual's future economic situation. Because the unified trans-
fer tax credit is only available when the transfer occurs at or
after the death of the deemed transferor, this technique cannot
be utilized by cutting off beneficiaries' interests at specified
early ages.
182
It must also be borne in mind that the generation-skipping
tax excludes trusts for ancestors, parents, siblings, and spouses,
without dollar limitation. 8 3 This factor, in combination with the
substantial unified transfer tax credit, will have a significant ef-
fect on the pattern of devolution of small or medium estates,
especially of married persons. Couples have traditionally split
the propertied spouse's estate into roughly equal marital-de-
duction and residual trusts. The taxable estate does not include
the value of a properly qualified marital-deduction trust, 8 4 and
the residual trust would not be taxed upon the death of the
surviving spouse, even though the latter would be a beneficiary
of the trust.185 One of the objectives of the split-trust arrange-
ment has been to minimize the estate tax upon the death of the
second spouse. Because the marital-deduction trust must incur
estate tax with respect to the second spouse,' 86 routine practice is
to make the trust large enough to qualify for the maximum
marital deduction but no larger. 8 7 Henceforth, given a unified
'12 See note 150 supra & accompanying text.
183 This statement follows from the definitions of a "generation-skipping trust" and
of "generations" found in I.R.C. §§ 2611(b) & (c). The exclusion holds true regardless
of the ages of the siblings or spouse as compared to that of the grantor. See text accom-
panying notes 33-37 supra. A cynical person might suggest that the generation-skipping
tax creates an incentive for wealthy persons to "rob the cradle." It has been proposed
that property should be permitted to be transferred from one spouse to another free of
tax only after the marriage has lasted five years, or the couple has had a natural-born
child. See 3 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION 127 (1966) (Canada).
184 I.R.C. §§ 2056(a),(b), & (e). To qualify, an interest must (1) pass from the dece-
dent to his surviving spouse, (2) be includible in the decedent's gross estate, and (3)
avoid being a non-deductible terminable interest.183 See note 1 supra & accompanying text.
186 In order to prevent the marital deduction trust from being a non-deductible
terminable interest, the spouse who is the sole beneficiary must possess a general power
of appointment that is exercisable by him or her alone and in all events. I.R.C.
§ 2056(b)(5). This power of appointment causes inclusion of the trust property in the
surviving spouse's gross estate under I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2). Alternatively, qualification for
the marital deduction is obtained when the corpus is payable to the spouse's estate.
I.R.C. § 2056(b)(1)(A).
18' For a discussion of the maximum marital deduction, see note 189 infra. Formula
clauses in wills and trusts achieve the intended result, usually, by creating a trust equal
to the amount of the excess of the maximum marital deduction for federal estate
tax purposes over the sum of bequests, etc., to the surviving spouse (which pass out-
side of the formula clause) that qualify for the marital deduction. See A. CASNER,
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transfer tax credit that will effectively exempt $175,625 from the
tax base by 1981,188 the first spouse can more easily divert assets
from the marital-deduction trust into the residual trust, which is
not taxed upon the death of the second spouse. Due to the size
of the unified transfer tax credit, optimal utilization of the in-
creased marital deduction under the Tax Reform Act of 1976
will create real benefits only for those with adjusted gross
estates of between $350,000 and $500,000. 189
B. Postponement Rules
The postponement rules are tempting avenues for delaying
and thus minimizing exposure to the generation-skipping tax.
ESTATE PLANNING 791-806 (3d ed. 1961); note 189 infra.
I's For gifts made and decedents dying after 1976, the unified transfer tax credit,
found in I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2505, added by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, §§ 2001(a)(2),
2001(b)(2), is $47,000 for 1981 and subsequent years, $42,500 for 1980, $38,000 for
1979 and $34,000 for 1978. The estate tax credit for decedents dying in 1977 is
$30,000; the gift tax credit for gifts made in the first half of 1977 is $6,000 and for
gifts made in the latter half of 1977 is $30,000. A credit of $47,000 translates into a
deduction of $175,625. The exemption of $60,000 of I.R.C. § 2052 (1954) is repealed.
Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 2001(a)(4).
189 Under I.R.C. § 2056(c)(1)(A), as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
§ 2002(a), the maximum marital deduction is equal to the greater of $250,000 or 50%
of the decedent's adjusted gross estate (gross estate less debts, expenses and losses). For
estates of about $175,000 or less no qualifying marital deduction gift need be used
because the estate will not be subject to tax in any event due to the unified trans-
fer tax credit. See note 188 supra. The next $250,000 in assets can be given to the
spouse free of tax under the expanded maximum marital deduction. If the estate's
value is less than $350,000, however, the size of an efficiently effected marital deduc-
tion gift will be smaller than that under pre-1977 law, under which the maximum mari-
tal deduction was 50% of the decedent's adjusted gross estate. See I.R.C. § 2056(c)(1)
(1954). For example, in an estate of $275,000, $175,000 would be in the residual trust,
and $100,000 would be in the marital deduction trust. If an estate's value is between
$425,000 and $500,000, no more than $250,000 should be left to the surviving spouse,
because anything more would exceed the transfer tax credit and maximum marital de-
duction. For estates valued beyond the $500,000 plateau (which is twice the "minimum"
maximum marital deduction), 50% of the excess may be added to the marital deduction
trust. This reflects no change, however, from prior law. A formula clause that would
accord with the foregoing suggestions could be written along these lines:
If my spouse survives me, I bequeath to (him, her) an amount equal to
the excess of the "tentative marital deduction bequest," described in the next
sentence hereof, over the sum of amounts which qualify for the marital deduc-
tion for federal estate tax purposes which pass to such spouse outside of this
clause of this instrument. The "tentative marital deduction bequest" is an amount
equal to the excess of my taxable estate for federal estate tax purposes, com-
puted without regard to the federal estate tax marital deduction, over the
exemption equivalent of the maximum federal unified transfer credit avail-
able to my estate, but said amount shall not in any event exceed the maximum
marital deduction allowable for federal estate tax purposes.
For discussion of another aspect of the relationship between the generation-skipping
tax and the marital deduction, see notes 147-48 supra & accompanying text.
GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFERS
The most obvious possibility (subject to the Rule Against Per-
petuities) would be to create a discretionary trust for a large
number of beneficiaries of the same generation. For example,
consider a trust established for the benefit of the grantor's
grandchildren and their spouses until the death of the survivor,
with remainder to the grantor's then surviving issue.' 9" Alterna-
tively, a trust for the grantor's children and their spouses, fol-
lowed by interests in the grantor's parents, uncles, aunts, spouse,
and siblings, would probably invoke the unusual-order-of-death
postponement rule.' 9 '
Although such arrangements present significant tax avoid-
ance opportunities to the taxpayer, countervailing considerations
must be weighed. The Treasury is expressly authorized to issue
regulations proscribing the use of nominal or "dummy" same-
generation beneficiaries, especially where income accumulations
during their tenure can be foreseen. 92 Moreover, the post-
ponement rule can be negated by regulation in cases where each
same-generation beneficiary possesses, in effect, a separate share
of the trust.' 93 Finally, in appropriate instances, the regulations
may prevent abuse of the unnatural-order-of-deaths postpone-
ment rule.
194
In a similar vein, a trust can be created for the grantor's
grandchildren, with remainder to a charity. Not only will this
trust escape the generation-skipping tax, but the grantor may
also obtain a charitable deduction against his income and trans-
19" See I.R.C. § 2613(b)(2)(B); text accompanying note 82 supra.
191 See note 87 supra & accompanying text.
192 See I.R.C. § 2613(b)(2)(B); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 51 & n.5. For ex-
ample, a "dummy" beneficiary might be one who is not a descendant of the grantor
where other beneficiaries and remaindermen under the trust are descendants of the
grantor. If, however, the trustee does not have the power to accumulate, then presum-
ably the beneficiaries are genuine.
193 See I.R.C. § 2622. An example is a situation involving a trust for the grantor's
children in which each child obtains a pro rata share of the income from the trust, and
upon a child's death a pro rata portion of the corpus is distributed to (or held for) such
child's successors in interest. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 51; CONFERENCE
REPORT, supra note 21, at 618. The determination of the existence of separate shares
will presumably accord with the analogous rules with respect to the income taxation of
trusts. See Treas. Reg. § 1.663(c)-3 (1972).
194 I.R.C. § 2613(b)(2)(C)(i). These regulations would probaibly cover situations in
which a higher generation beneficiary does not, or is not expected to, receive substan-
tial benefits under the trust, or in which that beneficiary has a long life expectancy or is
not himself a younger generation beneficiary (so that his death will not be a taxable
termination). An example would be a trust for the grantor's aged and sickly son for life,
then to the grantor's 22 year old wife, with the remainder over, assuming that the son
dies first.
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fer taxes. 195
Conceivably, a taxpayer may use the postponement rules or
a charitable-remainder trust in conjunction with the $250,000
exclusion. This possibility depends upon whether grandchildren
must receive interests that will be includable in their gross estates
in order to qualify their parent as a deemed transferor eligible
for the $250,000 exlusion.
196
C. Disclaimers
Retroactive planning may be accomplished through the
newly-enacted mechanism of section 2518 by which a beneficiary
may disclaim an interest in a generation-skipping trust1 97 A cor-
pus distributee in a taxable distribution might avoid tax liabil-
ity in this fashion. A disclaimer, or a series thereof, can probably
eliminate a younger generation of beneficiaries entirely, thereby
resulting in the elimination of the generation-skipping tax it-
self.198 The disclaimer provisions are somewhat ambiguous with
"'See note 140 supra & accompanying text. To qualify for income, estate and gift
tax deductions, the trust must be a charitable remainder annuity trust or a charitable
remainder unitrust (or a pooled income fund), with no power to invade corpus for the
benefit of the non-charitable beneficiaries. I.R.C. §§ 170(f)(2)(A), 2055(e)(2), 2522(c)(2).
Congress' allowance of multiple charitable deductions with respect to one transfer
seems overly generous.
'96 See notes 124-25 supra & accompanying text. The possibility of so combining the
benefits of these rules is a reason for strictly construing the exclusion.
"I See I.R.C. § 2614(c). The uniform disclaimer rules are contained in I.R.C.
§§ 2045 (estate tax), 2518 (gift tax), added by § 2009(b) of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
These sections provide that a disclaimer may be effected not later than nine months
after the day on which the interest is created or the beneficiary attains the age of
twenty-one, by a written, irrevocable and unqualified refusal to accept an interest in
property, regardless of state law on the subject. See HousE REPORT, supra note 21, at 65-68.
191 In the case of a taxable termination, a literal reading of the statute appears to
preclude the use of disclaimers to eliminate the existence of a younger generation for
the purpose of determining the existence of a generation-skipping trust. Consider, for
example, a trust for the benefit of the grantor's child C for life, with remainder to
grandchild D if living, but if D is not living, to the grantor's nephew N or his estate.
Assume that at the death of C, both D and N are living, but D disclaims his interest.
The statute perpetuates a generation-skipping transfer in this case because D (a lower
generation beneficiary) "exists" as of the moment just prior to the termination of C's
interest. I.R.C. §§ 261 1(a) & (b), 2613(b)(1) & (c)(2). Although the identity of the "trans-
feree" has shifted from D to N, under I.R.C. § 2518 the definition of "deemed trans-
feror" in I.R.C. § 2612(a) does not require that the parent of the transferee is himself a
younger generation beneficiary. It apparently follows that the deemed transferor of the
generation-skipping transfer is whichever of N's parents is more closely related to the
grantor. This approach, however, does not seem consistent with the statutory plan. See
text accompanying note 102 supra. If the alternate remainder were to a charity (rather
than N), a full charitable deduction would be available. Therefore, the regulations
should indicate that in situations such as that described above there is no generation-
skipping transfer.
GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFERS
respect to which events provide an opportunity to disclaim. 199
D. Separate Trusts
One final major tax-avoidance possibility must be men-
tioned. It appears that a taxpayer may be able to establish sepa-
rate trusts for different generations: trust A for the benefit of
the grantor's children for their joint lives, with remainder to the
grantor's great-grandchildren; and trust B for the benefit of the
grantor's grandchildren, also with remainder to the grantor's
great-grandchildren. The advantage of the split-trust is that
there will be one taxable transfer when the survivor of the chil-
dren dies (trust A) and one when the grandchildren have died
(trust B). If there had been a single trust for the children, then
to the grandchildren, then to the great-grandchildren, two tax-
able transfers would have occurred with respect to the value of
the single large trust before its benefits reached the great-
grandchildren. Either trust may lie dormant for a period of time
accumulating income which will increase the ultimate genera-
tion-skipping tax base. This prospect may be avoided by provid-
ing for liberal powers of corpus invasion for the active trust.
Although an arrangement of this type might appear to be
economically practical only for the very wealthy, in fact, it could
be utilized by a broad range of grantors.
The possibility of a split-trust arrangement is not mentioned
in the statute or committee reports. Nor is it literally covered by
the provision dealing with "trust equivalents. ' 2"0 Nevertheless,
the Treasury should attempt to close this loophole by issuing
regulations purporting to combine separate trusts. Section 2622
confers specific authority upon the Treasury to issue such regu-
lations under chapter 13 as "may be necessary or appropriate to
199The Conference Report, supra note 21, at 617, states that the event triggering
the disclaimer period is the generation-skipping transfer. This interpretation seems con-
trary to the language of I.R.C. § 2518, which states that the nine month period is
triggered by the transfer "creating" the interest to be disclaimed, which could be read
to mean the date of the creation of the trust. In any event, there appears to be nothing
in § 2518 to prevent a beneficiary from disclaiming an interest before the transfer,
shortly after the creation of the trust, or before reaching his twenty-first birthday.200 See notes 66-68 supra & accompanying text. Section 261 1(d)(1) states that a trust
equivalent "means any arrangement which, although not a trust, has substantially the same
effect as a generation-skipping trust." (Emphasis supplied). To be sure, an arrangement
consisting of two or more trusts is not "a" trust and therefore is not literally within the
italicized phrase. However, in the absence of any reference to this problem in the legis-
lative history, it is difficult to infer that § 261 l(d) was intended to reach multiple trust
arrangements.
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carry out the purposes" of the generation-skipping provisions. 2 °1
Such "legislative," as opposed to "interpretative," regulations
would have the force of law if reasonable and within the scope of
the granted authority. 2112 Regulations directed at an obvious
loophole, though not expressly sanctioned, would appear to
come within the ambit of section 2622.2( 3 Moreover, separate
trusts containing broad powers of invasion are closely analogous
to annuity-death benefit combinations covered by the "trust
equivalent" provision.' 4 Because the results should not differ
for the very wealthy who can afford to leave the corpus of each
trust intact, a reasonable basis exists for extending the analogy to
trusts without liberal invasion powers. Finally, regulations along
the lines suggested would find substantive support in the case
law dealing with reciprocal transfers.2'" The regulations should
apply at a minimum to separate trusts created under the same
instrument, and to trusts created under multiple instruments
taking effect at the same time. °6 Other situations could be dealt
with on a case-by-case basis. °7
VII. EFFECTIVE DATES
The new provisions are applicable only to generation-skip-
ping transfers made after April 30, 1976.2o8 Therefore, trusts
which were irrevocable on that date are "grandfathered. 20 9
201 I.R.C. § 2622.
20 2 See Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948). See
also Joseph Weidenhoff, Inc., 32 T.C. 1222, 1241 (1959), acq. in result, 1960-2 C.B. 7.
203 Cf. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 53 n.8 (stating that trusts created by a
donor's spouse are aggregated with those of a donor for purposes of the exclusion for
any of their children, although no mention of this is made in I.R.C. § 2613(b)(6)).204 See I.R.C. § 2611(d)(2).
21 Cf. United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316 (1969) (construing Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, § 81 l(c)(1)(B), 63 Stat. 894 (now I.R.C. § 2036)). Although this decision
rested primarily on the objective manner in which the pieces fit together, in less obvious
cases the same result could be obtained under a finding of tax-avoidance intent. See 60
MICH. L. REV. 631 (1962). Although Estate of Grace dealt with the "transfer" require-
ment of the predecessor of I.R.C. §§ 2036-38 in a two-grantor context, its principle is
applicable to the one-grantor, two-trusts situation, and it undermines the separate-
contract rule of Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, 356 U.S. 274 (1958) (pre-1954
law).260 The time in question is the settlor's death. The regulations could be phrased to
encompass testamentary trusts and any trust whose value is includible in the settlor's
gross estate under I.R.C. §§ 2035-38.
20'7 Any approach should take account of: (1) identity of the settlor(s); (2) size of the
trusts; (3) the class of beneficiaries; and (4) a tax-avoidance motive. See note 203 supra.
200 Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 2006(c)(1).
209 However, if transfer or addition is made to a pre-May 1, 1976, irrevocable
trust, the generation-5kipping rules will apply pro tanto. Tax Reform Act of 1976,
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Moreover, and somewhat incredibly, a donee of a special power
of appointment created by an instrument which was irrevocable
as of the April 30, 1976 cut-off date can create future genera-
tion-skipping arrangements that will also avoid the generation-
skipping tax.
210
The transitional rules also treat trusts under amendable wills
and revocable trust instruments existing on April 30, 1976
generously. They are not considered to be generation-skipping
trusts if the grantor dies before 1982,2 1 or even later in cases of
incompetency.2 12 Therefore, subject to a note of caution,213 a
taxpayer need not revise an amendable will or revocable trust
until December 31, 1981 draws near. Moreover, these wills and
trusts can be amended and altered in the meantime, as long
as generation-skipping arrangements are not created or in-
creased. 214 Again, the definition of such a creation or increase is
not altogether clear.215 A final question requiring clarification is
§ 2006(c)(2)(A). See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 59. Although it is not clear
whether the amount to be subject to tax is the amount of the corpus transferred to the
trust after April 30, 1976, or the pro rata portion of the trust on the date of transfer
attributable to such contributions, the latter seems proper.
21( This assumes that the exercise of this special, power of appointment would not
be taxable under I.R.C. § 2041(a)(3) or § 2514(d) (applying to the exercise of a power
of appointment by creating another such power). CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 2 1, at
621. This result is surely too generous, because the donee will not be compelled to
create a generation-skipping trust.
211 Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 2006(c)(2)(B).
212 1d. If the decedent was unable to change the disposition of his property on
April 30, 1976 because of mental disability, the grace period for amendment is two
years after he first regains his competence.
213 The caveat alluded to is that the unrevised trust or will is subject to the tax if
the decedent was competent on April 30, 1976, becomes disabled after that date, and
dies after 1981.
214 Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 2006(c)(2)(B).
215 
See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 620. If interests for beneficiaries of a
generation younger than the grantor's which had not previously been provided for
are created (or powers of appointment are added which can be exercised to the same
effect) by amending a will or trust after April 30, 1976, the trust will become subject to
the new provisions. Adding new members to a generational class, or changing members
within such a class, would not constitute an increase. Assuming a generation-skipping
trust is to be funded by the residue of the grantor's estate, it would appear that the
deletion of legacies would result in a tax-invoking increase. Commentators have sug-
gested that the substitution of a charitable beneficiary for an individual would also run
afoul of the transitional rule. See McCoy, Pearl & Abramson, The New Estate and Git
Tax Law-An Initial View, 1976-3 EST., GiFrts & TR. J. 4, 10. A contemplated change in
a marital deduction formula bequest, perhaps to conform to the 1976 changes, see note
189 supra, which could reduce the amount of the bequest, should be approached with
caution. Although increasing the duration of a younger generational interest would
negate the grandfather provision, the result if other younger generational interests are
shortened pro tanto is especially difficult to predict. The grandfather rule applies only
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whether additional cash or property can be transferred to revoc-
able trusts after April 30, 1976. There is reason to believe that
such actions would not negate the transitional rules.
21 6
VIII. CONCLUSION
Chapter 13 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 is designed to
eliminate an existing tax incentive for creating generation-
skipping arrangements by approximating the tax that would
have been imposed if the property had passed outright. The tax
should not be viewed as a penalty on generation-skipping ar-
rangements. Rather, the estate planner and his client should
consider the merits of generation-skipping arrangements pri-
marily on the basis of family, management, income tax and dis-
position considerations. In addition, considering the limited
scope of the new rules with respect to spouses, parents, and
children of the grantor, it is not likely that the institution of the
trust will wither away because of the generation-skipping tax.
Nevertheless, the estate advisor will want to minimize or delay
exposure to the generation-skipping tax to the extent compatible
with the client's plan of property devolution.
Despite precipitous eiactment, serious conceptual flaws,
avoidable ambiguities, and unnecessary complexities, the new
statutory provisions are not as formidable or as defective as they
might have been, nor do they appear to contain many unin-
tended loopholes. Many of the more common trust arrange-
ments will remain relatively unscathed, and will continue to be
used for purposes other than tax avoidance. The appearance of
regulations, and even perhaps legislative proposals from the new
administration, are awaited with keen interest.
to amendments (including codicils); it would not protect new instruments, even if sub-
stantially identical to pre-May 1976 instruments.
216 Perhaps, the augmented portion of the trust would be regarded as not "in exis-
tence" within § 2006(c)(2)(B), and, hence, not "grandfathered." Yet this same section
refers only to "amendments," whereas § 2006(c)(2)(A), dealing with irrevocable trusts,
refers to "additions." Therefore, the "creation or increase of generation-skipping ar-
rangements" restriction pertaining to revocable trusts would probably not apply to addi-
tions. Moreover, a testamentary trust, or pour-overs to a revocable trust, can be aug-
mented without risk by reason of the grantor's becoming more wealthy or otherwise
altering his property-holding arrangements. Therefore, additions to revocable trusts
should be permitted. See note 215 supra.
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